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This thesis examines the British involvement in the current Bosnian War by 
focusing on two specific policy determinants, strategic culture and national 
interests. The thesis assigns working definitions to these two concepts and then 
applies them to the Balkan conflict to determine how each has motivated the 
British decision to intervene in the current crisis. The thesis also provides a 
concise survey of the historical British interests in the Balkans, in support of this 
study. The thesis concludes that each concept has exerted some influence on 
British decision-making with respect to the Balkans. Indeed, strategic culture can 
wield considerable impact in the formation of British foreign policy. The narrowly 
defined concept of national interest that is employed in this work has also been a 
factor in British efforts in the current Balkan struggle, only to a lesser degree. 
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Great Britain has been one of the main contributors to the 
peacekeeping contingent in Bosnia, with some 3700 British troops on 
the ground in the war-torn state. The United States has thus far 
refrained from this level of commitment to the conflict, limiting 
its contributions to mainly humanitarian airdrops and maritime 
support missions. Great Britain has repeatedly sought increased 
U.S. participation in Bosnia in the form of ground forces but this 
has not materialized to date. 
This fact raises interesting questions about the security 
concerns of these two NATO allies in the post-Cold War world, where 
the absence of a common threat and purpose has removed many of the 
foreign policy restrictions of old. In the future, the United 
States may have to entertain the question of providing support to 
these allies during the course of individual operations which are 
not necessarily in keeping with the previous collective interests 
of the alliance. 
This thesis examines the British involvement in the current 
Bosnian War by focusing on two specific policy determinants, 
strategic culture and national interests. The thesis assigns 
working definitions to these two concepts and then applies them to 
the Balkan conflict to determine how each has motivated the British 
decision to participate in the current crisis. The thesis also 
provides a concise survey of the historical British interests in 
the Balkans, in support of this study.  The hypothesis of the 
IX 
thesis is that each concept has exerted some influence on British 
decision-making with respect to the Balkans. 
The thesis concludes that strategic culture can wield 
considerable impact in the formation of British foreign policy. 
The narrowly defined concept of national interest that is employed 
in this work also contributes to British efforts in the current 
Balkan struggle, only to a lesser degree. 
x 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
A.  THE CURRENT CRISIS 
The current Balkan War represents the largest military 
conflict in Europe since World War Two.  Since the outbreak 
of hostilities in Slovenia in June of 1991, the fighting has 
spread to other regions of the former Yugoslavia with the 
state of Bosnia-Hercegovina becoming the main battleground. 
The relatively minor skirmishes that marked the onset of the 
affair have been wholly replaced during the course of the 
last three years by major clashes between Croats, Muslims 
and Serbs.  Now, as the war continues unabated, save for the 
periodic token ceasefires, the world watches in dismay as 
the death toll mounts and one historic site after another is 
leveled. 
The United Nations has been making an effort to bring 
the war to an end through a massive peacekeeping mission, 
but it appears that peace is still a long way off. 
Furthermore, with U.N. forces having come under attack this 
past year, and with the recent indications that a majority 
of nations are in favor of lifting the arms embargo against 
Bosnia-Hercegovina, the stage may set for the removal of all 
U.N. peacekeepers, leaving the actors in the Balkans to 
their destinies.1 
'Barbara Crossette, "U.N. Assembly Approve Call for End to 
Bosnian Arms Embargo", New  York   Times, November 4, 1994, p.A4. 
See also, Roger Cohen, "Maps, Guns and Bosnia", New  York   Times, 
December 6, 1994, pp. Al, A3. 
Several nations, however, have devoted much in the way 
of resources and personnel to the peacekeeping effort in the 
former Yugoslavia, and remain committed to it.  In April 
1994, some thirty-five countries maintained nearly 36,000 
troops in the Balkans to assist the U.N. in enforcing its 
peacekeeping operations.  The war-torn state of Bosnia has 
received the greatest concentration of troops to date, some 
17,000 strong.  Two nations in particular--France and the 
United Kingdom--have contributed the most to this Bosnian 
contingent, accounting for roughly 45% of the total U.N. 
force.2 
The United States has only token force levels in the 
theater in general and literally a handful in Bosnia.  This 
lack of intervention in the form of ground forces by the 
U.S. has indicated the degree to which the United States has 
thus far been willing to get involved in the conflict.  And 
despite repeated calls from the United Kingdom, and others, 
for the deployment of additional American forces to the 
beleaguered area, the Clinton administration has maintained 
that American "peacekeepers" will not step on Balkan soil en 
-Steven R. Bowman, "Bosnia and Macedonia: U.S. Military 
Operations", Congressional Research Service Issue Brief, 
August 24, 1994, pp. 11-12. 
masse until there is a genuine peace to be kept in the 
region.3 
Such a peace as the one the United States has been 
holding out for may still indeed be a long way off.  The 
Croats and Muslims who had suffered heavy losses for most of 
the first three years of battle, and had agreed in principle 
during peace negotiations to a partitioning of Bosnia, now 
appear to be militarily rejuvenated.  They may therefore 
prove less likely to opt for a settlement, especially if 
they feel that they now possess the capability to achieve 
more frequent victories in battle and regain territory lost 
in earlier defeats.  In the meantime, France and the U.K. 
will continue to shoulder the burden in a Bosnia where 
tensions have not eased and peacekeepers are under an almost 
constant threat of harm from any and all of the 
participating belligerents.  To date, the United Kingdom has 
suffered twelve fatalities among its troops in the former 
Yugoslavia, yet has not let the specter of body bags deter 
it from its mission; Lord David Owen has accused the United 
States of being intimidated by this specter, in view of the 
U.S. level of involvement in the Balkans.4 
3John Lancaster,  "NATO's  'Neutrality'  May Be Early 
Casualty", Washington Post,   April 11, 1994, pp. Al, A12. 
4Eugene Robinson, "EC Mediator Says U.S. 'Killed' Plan 
for Bosnia", Washington Post,   November 27, 1993, p. A22. 
That the United States has chosen to distance itself 
from this European crisis, despite continued pleas for 
assistance from its close ally, Great Britain, has raised 
important questions with regard to the post-Cold War 
national interests of both nations.  Clearly, the United 
Kingdom has deemed the Balkan unrest important enough to 
commit thousands of ground troops to the region.  And the 
British have done this knowing full well that this could 
lead to an increased military commitment there. 
This potential quagmire-in-the-making argument (coupled 
with the 1992-1994 debacle in Somalia) in part explains why 
the Clinton administration has refrained from intensifying 
the U.S. commitment to the United Nations Protection Forces 
(UNPROFOR) assets in theater.  Predictably, American allies 
in Europe can find little comfort in such an explanation, 
especially when the prospects for a lasting peace in the 
region appear so dim. 
How then can one explain the current makeup of 
peacekeeping forces in the Balkans, and more specifically in 
devastated Bosnia?  Are the national interests of Cold War 
allies such as the U.S. and the U.K. suddenly so drastically 
different as to warrant distinctly separate policies in the 
region? 
Several high-level U.S. officials including Senator Sam 
Nunn, the Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman, and 
4 
William Perry, the Secretary of Defense, have stated that 
U.S. interests mainly lie in preventing the present conflict 
from spreading to neighboring areas.  It is feared that such 
a turn of events could lead to a much larger Balkan War, 
possibly even pitting perennial NATO rivals Greece and 
Turkey against one another once more.5  This potential 
disruption to NATO cohesion helps to explain the deployment 
of approximately 400 U.S. troops bordering the conflict in 
the country known as the Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia. 
But what of the interests of the United Kingdom in the 
Balkans?  Does it suffice to say that containment of the 
battle to the areas already afflicted is the British goal as 
well, or are there other considerations at work that do not 
coincide with U.S. objectives?  Is it possible that the U.K. 
feels more responsible for resolving the conflict merely 
because of its closer proximity to the Balkans?  Have the 
British perhaps used their early commitment to the affair to 
demonstrate a decreased reliance on the United States in the 
post-Cold War European order? 
This thesis examines Britain's involvement in the 
current struggle in an attempt to determine what factors 
have motivated it to commit thousands of ground troops to 
5John F. Harris,  "Perry Sees Wider Role in Bosnia", 
Washington  Post,   July 18, 1994, pp. Al, A20. 
the peacekeeping cause in the Balkans.  The work focuses on 
strategic culture as a determinant, among others, of British 
policy-making.  The study includes a historical review of 
British interests in the Balkans as well as an examination 
of the current justifications for British involvement there. 
The work analyzes the origins and continuing dynamics of 
British operations in Bosnia, with a view to determining the 
extent to which British involvement reflects calculations of 
national interest as well as the influence of British 
strategic culture.  The hypothesis is that neither 
explanation is satisfactory, if considered in isolation, and 
that the combination of the two analytical frameworks may 
advance understanding of British motives. 
The thesis is be based on a qualitative analysis of 
current and historical sources on British policy in order to 
explain current decision-making regarding Bosnia.  The 
elusive and demanding concept of strategic culture will be 
employed in as rigorous a fashion as possible to identify 
the principal features of British strategic culture that are 
pertinent in today's conflict. 
This is an important topic with respect to the future 
of U.S. national security policy for three main reasons. 
First, it may help to explain why the United Kingdom, in 
some ways the most reliable twentieth-century American ally, 
is militarily immersed in the Bosnian conflict, albeit in a 
6 
peacekeeping function.  To date the United States has 
limited its roles in the fighting in the former Yugoslavia 
mainly to air and maritime functions and has avoided 
committing large numbers of ground forces.  Second, a deeper 
understanding of British involvement in this conflict may 
shed light on how British strategic culture and decision- 
making may define present and future British national 
interests.  And third, because of the contrasting interests 
of the nations that border the former Yugoslavia, the 
Bosnian conflict has immediate and potential long-term 
importance for the future of Western security as a whole. 
B.  STRATEGIC CULTURE 
Prior to embarking on an examination of the aspects of 
British strategic culture that may be affecting British 
policy today, it is necessary to provide an introduction to 
the concept of strategic culture in general. 
Strategic culture is a relatively new term in the field 
of international relations, having appeared on the scene in 
1977.  Yet its use has already evolved to encompass much 
more than was intended when it was originally introduced. 
Jack Snyder first coined the phrase in a 1977 Rand paper in 
which he sought to explain the process by which future 
generations of Soviet officers would be indoctrinated 
regarding the employment of nuclear weapons.  The defining 
paragraph follows: 
It is useful to look at the Soviet 
approach to strategic thinking as a 
unique 'strategic culture'.  Individuals 
are socialized into a distinctively 
Soviet mode of strategic thinking.  As a 
result of this socialization process, a 
set of general beliefs, attitudes and 
behavioral patterns with regard to 
nuclear strategy has achieved a state of 
semipermanence that places them on the 
level of 'culture' rather than mere 
policy.  Of course, attitudes may change 
as a result of changes in technology and 
the international environment.  However, 
new problems are not assessed 
objectively.  Rather, they are seen 
through the perceptual lens provided by 
the strategic culture.7 
Snyder's original terminology, with its relatively 
precise meaning, has since been recast by international 
relations scholars.  "Strategic culture" has thus become an 
analytical concept that differs from the prototype in two 
very distinct ways.  First, it is generally accepted that 
strategic culture is a neutral concept, applicable to all 
nations to different degrees.  The obvious second difference 
is that the phrase is not limited to the field of nuclear 
weapons study.  It is useful then to examine how some of the 
many torchbearers of strategic culture have re-defined this 
'Jack Snyder as quoted by Ken Booth in Strategic Power: 
USA/USSR Carl G. Jacobsen, editor (London: Macmillan, 1990), 
p. 122. 
concept in an attempt to shed light on what comprises it and 
how it can affect decision-making within a state. 
Professor Alastair I. Johnston of Harvard University 
offered this definition of the concept in a recent work: 
Most of those who use 'strategic 
culture' explicitly or implicitly tend 
to argue that there are consistent and 
persistent historical patterns in the 
way particular states (or state elites) 
think about the use of force for 
political ends.  That is, different 
states have different predominant 
strategic preferences that are rooted in 
the vearly' or- 'formative' military 
experiences of the state, and are 
influenced to some degree by the 
philosophical, political, cultural and 
cognitive characteristics of the state 
and state elites as these develop 
through time.8 
Time is an important factor in the composition of 
strategic culture for two main reasons.  First, strategic 
culture may encompass the historical experiences of 
"nations", in the cultural sense, long before they became 
nation-states in the modern connotation.  For example, a 
study of the strategic culture of modern China would no 
doubt reveal the influence of Confucian thought on the 
society.  Likewise, an analysis of present day Hungary would 
be incomplete without considering the impact of the Hapsburg 
and Ottoman Empires.  Where to begin when undertaking the 
8Alastair I. Johnston, Thinking About Strategic Culture, 
Harvard University Working Paper, December 1993, p. 1. 
study of a nation's strategic culture involves a degree of 
subjective judgement. 
Second, strategic culture is an evolving concept that 
can reflect changes in both the domestic and international ■ 
environments.  This process may happen slowly or relatively 
abruptly.  Moreover, like culture in general, strategic 
culture can never rest on past laurels and must adapt to 
particular changing conditions or risk assuming a certain 
degree of "strategic backwardness." 
Samuel H. Barnes brings out this point about culture in 
his 1988 study.  "Strategic culture" can be effectively 
substituted for "culture" in the following excerpt: 
...it (culture) is continually being 
modified, often in profound ways, by a 
variety of influences.  Culture is an 
historical phenomenon, existing in space 
and time.  It meets human needs, and in 
the long run a culture withers and dies 
if it does not do this with some level 
of effectiveness.  Culture exists not 
only within a human environment but also 
within physical and international 
environments;  it reacts to changes in 
all these spheres.  How much a culture 
adjusts is in part a function of its 
strength and its ability to repel 
demands from these various 
environments.9 
Just as Barnes describes the demise of a culture that 
fails to meet human needs, so too can a specific strategic 
"Samuel  H.  Barnes,  "Politics  and  Culture"  Working 
Paper,(Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988), p.12. 
10 
culture fail to meet the security needs of the nation-state, 
with ensuing adverse consequences. 
Ken Booth offers another definition of the elements of 
strategic culture and how they interact to influence a 
nation's foreign policy: 
The concept of strategic culture refers 
to a nation's traditions, values, 
attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, 
symbols, achievements and particular 
ways of adapting to the environment and 
solving problems with respect to the 
threat or use of force....The strategic 
culture of a nation derives from its 
history, geography and political 
culture, and it represents the 
aggregation of the attitudes and 
patterns of behavior of the most 
influential voices; these may be, 
depending upon the nation, the political 
elite, the military establishment and/or 
public opinion.10 
Booth goes on to submit that strategic culture can be a 
predictive tool of sorts because it defines a set of 
patterns for a nation's behavior on war and peace issues. 
He further suggests that because of the continuities in 
state practices that arise in part due to the impact of 
strategic culture, it is legitimate to talk about a 
particular national "style" in the theory and practice of 
strategy.u 
10Ken Booth, The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed, 
Strategic Power: USA/USSR, Carl G. Jacobsen, editor (London: 
MacMillan, 1990), p. 121. 
"Ibid, p.121. 
11 
Not surprisingly, culture in general, let alone 
strategic culture, does not command much respect among 
political scientists with regard to its effects on decision- 
making because of the inherent difficulty (perhaps 
impossibility) of quantifying the concept in precise 
empirical terms or through the use of a universal model.  It 
is an admittedly difficult undertaking to identify the 
essential elements that comprise a "national style."  Yet as 
Booth warns, the difficulty of defining strategic culture 
does not justify ignoring it as a force in international 
affairs: 
The examination and validation of the 
concept of strategic culture will always 
be an intellectually demanding task.  It 
will also remain an art rather than_a 
science; like most important dimensions 
of international politics, its 
explication will never be amenable to 
quantification.  But it is a key concept 
and can only be ignored at someone's 
peril, be it to an academic reputation 
or a nation's security.12 
This is not to suggest that strategic culture is 
without support in the academic arena.  On the contrary, 
both Ken Booth and Alastair Johnston submit that a growing 
number of scholars in the international relations field have 
in recent years expressed interest in the pursuit of 
strategic culture-related concepts after having become 
12Ibid, p. 125. 
12 
discontented with theories governed by rigid assumptions and 
ahistorical models.13 
Additionally, Johnston emphasizes that the realist and 
neo-realist paradigms that have dominated much of the 
international security studies field do not have a monopoly 
on the concept of rationality.  Strategic culture-influenced 
decisions can contain elements of rational thinking but not 
to the extent postulated in game rationality or classical 
rational-choice expected-utility models.  Instead, within 
strategic culture, rationality is accompanied by a 
historically imposed inertia on choice which makes strategic 
decision-making less responsive to the parameters of 
specific contingencies.14 
No single theory regarding the use of force by nation- 
states is predominant, and it is certainly not the intention 
here to field such a claim on behalf of strategic culture. 
Too often, however, political scientists, without violating 
that premise, have nonetheless discounted the importance of 
strategic culture altogether as a contributory variable in 
13
 See Booth, pp. 122-123; and Johnston, p. 4., including 
footnote 6. Booth suggests that the growth of interest in the 
cultural dimensions of the theory and practice of strategy was 
a reaction against such ahistorical approaches as game theory. 
In footnote 6, Johnston cites the 1988 work of Joseph Nye and 
Sean Lynn-Jones, who concluded that strategic studies has been 
characterized for too long by American ethnocentrism and a 
concomitant neglect of "national styles of strategy." 
14Johnston, p. 2 . 
13 
their theories and models.  Some question whether it even 
exists.  And with the difficulty in quantifying the concept, 
it has become in many instances easy to disregard it 
completely.15 
In stark contrast, strategic culture, by its nature, is 
a "complexity-friendly" concept--one that welcomes the 
existence of additional influential variables as a natural 
occurrence.  It does not claim the right to be the 
preeminent policy determinant in all cases.  It merely seeks 
its just due as an influential factor in the decision-making 
process.  Booth adeptly summarizes this point by asserting 
that what happens within the decision-making machinery of a 
nation "is not some game of politics divorced from the 
history, geography and political culture of that particular 
state; politics, plain or otherwise, take place in a 
distinctive socio-psychological area of the multicultural 
map of the world."16 
Lastly, it is crucial to remember two points when 
assessing strategic culture.  The first is that it is not a 
panacea with regard to explaining world events.  Its study 
merely provides an additional useful perspective, when 
attempting to explain the actions of states and state 
l5Booth, p. 124 
'Ibid, p. 124. 
14 
elites.  Second, the application of strategic culture to an 
issue does not void all other methods of analysis.  Nothing 
precludes analysts from arriving at comparable conclusions 
through other conceptual frameworks.  As was stated earlier, 
strategic culture does not reject rationality; it is 
entirely possible that a traditional "realist" approach to 
an issue could lead to the same course of action as that 
recommended by adherence to the tenets of one's strategic 
culture. 
When Ken Booth refers to patterns of behavior he is 
speaking of decisions, often times similar in nature, that 
have been made in the past.  At the time each decision was 
made it presumably involved a calculation based somewhat 
upon the national interests of that nation as seen by those 
in power.  That these decisions have been repeated, verified 
and continually applauded over the years, through changing 
circumstances, is the process by which they can become 
integral parts of a nation's national character or strategic 
culture. 
C.  THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
A nation can choose to embark on a particular policy 
with regard to foreign affairs for any number of reasons. 
It has already been suggested here that strategic culture 
may play a role in this decision-making process.  For 
15 
example, the perceptions, beliefs  and attitudes of the 
various personalities in positions of leadership and 
influence within countries constitute an important policy 
determinant in the eyes of historians. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, international 
relations theorists have for years offered hypotheses about 
states' behavior.  And while these scholars do not totally 
discount the contributions made by great men in history, 
they have developed concepts that supposedly supersede much 
of the decision-making at the individual level.  These 
foreign policy-making propositions have encompassed many 
theories and paradigms.  Resultant terms such as neorealism, 
structural realism, systemic theory, reductionist theory, 
etc., all have been used in one form or another to try to 
explain the actions of nation-states.  Like most other 
countries, Britain's endeavors in world affairs over the 
years have been thoroughly scrutinized by the proponents of 
these theories, with varying degrees of success. 
It is not the intention here to try to decide which of 
these ideas best fits British foreign policy history.  In 
fact, for the purposes of this thesis, it appears 
appropriate to consider one approach as a possible contrast 
with strategic culture as a policy determinant--the theory 
that states act in their "national interest." 
16 
Unfortunately, within international relations 
scholarship, the concept of "national interest" seems to be 
almost as difficult to pin down as strategic culture. 
According to Joseph Frankel, 
'National interest' is a singularly- 
vague concept.  It assumes a variety of 
meanings in the various contexts in 
which it is used and, despite its 
fundamental importance, these meanings 
often cannot be reconciled; hence no 
agreement can be reached about its 
ultimate meaning.17 
The above reflection is indeed a rather unsettling 
beginning to a book devoted to quantifying the concept of 
"national interest."  Nonetheless, that is exactly what 
Professor Frankel of the University of Southhampton 
attempted to do in the remainder of that particular work. 
His extensive efforts are beyond the scope of this study; 
yet, for our purposes,  the most important item to take away 
from his volume on national interest is this very disclaimer 
at the start of the book. 
Yet national interest is a concept undoubtedly more 
familiar to the attentive public than strategic culture. 
This is a result of the overuse, perhaps to the point of 
abuse, of the phrase national interest in the media. 
Newspapers often use the term loosely in articles discussing 
17Joseph Frankel, National Interest, (London: Pall Mall 
Press, Ltd., 1970), p. 15. 
17 
foreign policy as though their editors were privy to the 
contents of the national interest.  Politicians too are 
quick to employ the term when articulating their views on 
the appropriate courses of foreign policy.  Yet, this 
familiarity with the phrase does little to help clarify its 
meaning. 
It is almost as though it is assumed that the 
inhabitants of a given nation have reached a subconscious 
consensus with regard to its content and presumably rely 
upon their leadership to act accordingly in the 
international arena.  James Rosenau suggested that the 
phrase contains one central precept, but actually has two 
separate applications: 
As an analytical tool, it is employed to 
describe, explain, or evaluate the 
sources or the adequacy of a nation's 
foreign policy.  As an instrument of 
political action, it serves as a means 
of justifying, denouncing or proposing 
policies.  Both usages, in other words, 
refer to what is best for a national 
society.18 
This statement, despite assigning a degree of 
accountability to the idea of national interest, still does 
not offer up a clear definition of the same.  Moreover, as 
is the case with strategic culture, some political 
scientists find the employment of the concept so confusing 
l8James N. Rosenau,  "National Interest", International 
Encyclopedia  of Social   Sciences,   1968, p. 34. 
as to warrant dismissal of it altogether.  Raymond Aron, for 
instance, gives up the attempt at its rational definition, 
regarding it as either a formula vague to the point of being 
meaningless, or a pseudotheory.19 
Yet Frankel points out in his book that, despite its 
elusiveness,  a majority of political scientists do attach 
significance to the concept, to include such notable 
theorists as Has Morgenthau and Arnold Wolfers.  And once 
again, as is the case with strategic culture, national 
interest need not always be the prime decision-making 
element; but its existence necessitates that it is in fact 
one such element: 
Whether considered an independent, a 
mediating or a dependent variable, or 
just a rationalization, 'national 
interest' constitutes an element in the 
making of foreign policy to which, 
however it may be defined, statesmen 
profess to attach great importance.20 
A brief look at the way in which prominent British 
statesmen have attempted to define national interest is no 
more fruitful in yielding a working definition.  In 
confronting the issue of British national interest in a 
letter to then Foreign Secretary Clarendon in 1856, past and 
future Prime Minister Viscount Palmerston had this to say: 
19Raymond Aron, Peace and War, 1966, p. 89., as quoted in 
Frankel pp. 17-8. 
20 Frankel, p. 18. 
19 
"When people ask me... for what is called a policy, the only 
answer is that we mean to do what may seem to be best, upon 
each occasion as it arises, making the Interests of Our 
Country one's guiding principle."21  Additionally, at the 
turn of the century, Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey 
commented in his memoirs that: "British Foreign Ministers 
have been guided by what seemed to them to be the immediate 
interest of this country, without making elaborate 
calculations for the future."22 
Such seemingly ambiguous statements were common from 
British statesmen because, as Henry Kissinger suggests, 
Britain's geo-strategic position defined its ultimate 
security needs, and enabled its leaders to take an ad hoc 
approach to solving foreign policy questions: 
Great Britain required no formal 
strategy because its leaders understood 
the British interest so well and so 
viscerally that they could act 
spontaneously on each situation as it 
arose, confident that their public would 
follow....Convinced that they would 
recognize the British national interest 
when the'y saw it, British leaders felt 
no need to elaborate it in advance.23 
21Harold Temperley and Lillian Penson, Foundations of 
British Foreign Policy 1792-1902, (London: Frank Cass & Co., 
Ltd., 1938) p. 88. 
22R.W.  Seton-Watson,  Britain  in  Europe  1789-1914, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1937), p. 1. 
23 Kissinger, p. 96. 
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This observation is equally frustrating in its absolute 
vagueness about what constitutes the national interest.  Yet 
when combined with the earlier remarks by Palmerston and 
Grey it suggests that some calculation, however 
unscientific, of the "national interest" has always played a 
role in British foreign policy decisions. 
With all options exhausted, there is little choice left 
but to propose a working definition of national interest 
that reflects the vagueness of the earlier formulations 
while still allowing for a comparison with the other 
operative policy determinant in this study, strategic 
culture. 
In doing so it is important to distinguish between two 
generally accepted interpretations of "national interest." 
The first is a broadly conceived definition that, by its 
nature, can overlap in purpose and meaning with the concept 
of strategic culture.  This liberal connotation of the 
national interest can include such sweeping goals as the 
preservation of national cohesion, the promotion of a 
certain international order, or the upholding of a state's 
social and constitutional structure. 
The other interpretation of national interest, and the 
one used in this thesis for analytical purposes, is more 
narrowly defined and centered more along the lines of 
realist theory, sometimes known as "power politics," or 
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Realpolitik.  This definition of national interest concerns 
the pursuit of material interests such as power,24 
territory, and economic gains as the ends in foreign policy. 
It is a concept that focuses on near-term tangible 
acquisitions as opposed to far-reaching political ideals and 
social values. 
It is not so far-fetched then to consider a usable 
definition of national interest that is almost an antithesis 
of strategic culture.  Strategic culture-based decisions 
take into account factors such as values, morals and, 
historical and emotional concerns.  In this light, strategic 
culture can interpreted as a people's self-definition; it is 
a policy determinant that can involve purposes and 
priorities other than the pursuit of power and material 
gains.  Peregrine Worsthorne, the editor of the London 
Sunday Telegraph,   captures the essence of this point in 
assessing how British leaders of the nineteenth century 
decided to employ the Royal Navy to suppress the morally 
24See Martin Wight, Power Politics, (New York: Holmes & 
Meier Publishers, Inc., 1978) and Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics 
Among Nations, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Fifth Edition, 
1973) for discussion on The definitions and uses of power in 
foreign affairs. Morgenthau characterized relations between 
states as a struggle for the maximization of power. In this 
regard power was the national interest. The usage of power 
here is closer to that of Wight, who postulated that power 
could encompass concepts such as prestige and honor as well. 
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reprehensible slave trade despite its profitability to 
England in the commercial sense: 
...a rational consideration of the 
national interest is not enough to 
determine such matters.  National 
character comes into it as well....the 
British decided to do it for no better 
reason than that such action defined the 
kind of power Britain wanted to be.  It 
was a matter of national identity, not 
of foreign policy in any strict sense of 
the term.25 
The national interest can thus be seen as a factor that 
influences foreign policy without regard to these issues, 
and rather is only concerned with the immediate tangible 
results of a decision, considered in terms of power and 
material interests.  In this regard, for the purposes of a 
distinct comparison, it can be stated that if foreign policy 
actions are not attributable to strategic cultural concerns, 
then they must be due to a "dispassionate assessment of the 
national interest,"26 or to  some combination of the two. 
25Peregrine Worsthorne, "What Kind of People?", The 
National   Interest,   Winter 1990/91, p. 98. 
26Arnold Wolters, Discord and Collaboration: Essays on 
International Politics, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1962), p. 26. 
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II.  BRITISH STRATEGIC CULTURE 
The concept of strategic culture encourages a 
recognition of how difficult it is to apply it to the study 
of any particular nation.  A given state's strategic culture 
can be colored by many variables.  No "cookbook" list of 
principles exists--that is, points to consider that 
consistently yield insight about a nation's true character. 
Countries are like snowflakes in that each has been shaped 
by its own historical experiences; and each has emerged with 
a unique strategic culture. 
Moreover, any scholarly assessment of a national 
strategic culture is by definition a subjective exercise, 
and destined to come under scrutiny.  Nonetheless, it is 
important to identify certain aspects of the strategic 
culture of the United Kingdom in order to relate them to the 
current crisis.  Analyzing British strategic culture in its 
entirety would truly be a hefty task.  The subject could 
doubtless fill several volumes.  Such an effort is not 
undertaken here, yet it is critical to try to identify the 
elements of British strategic culture that might be relevant 
to today's Balkan conflict. 
This discussion of pertinent characteristics of British 
strategic culture does not, it should be noted, prioritize 
them in any specific order of importance.  After all, 
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Strategie culture, being a composite of factors, does not 
lend itself well to such an orderly breakdown, or ranking. 
There is no better way to initiate an examination 
of British strategic culture than by looking to one of the 
elements that Booth considers to be of critical importance-- 
geography.  In the case of Britain, its most obvious 
geographical trait--that it is an island nation--has been a 
blessing over the years in that it has quite literally 
helped it to survive.  The English Channel is a rather 
narrow passage, but when viewed as a defensive moat, it 
takes on size; and it has loomed very large throughout 
British history.  Its significance as an overwhelming 
obstacle to potential conquerors helps to account for the 
fact that Britain has not been successfully invaded since 
the battle of Hastings in 1066.27 
This immunity from foreign invasion was not due to a 
scarcity of sizable wars on the part of the British.  Since 
1689, England has been involved in some twelve major wars in 
which it was pitted, alone or in an alliance, against one or 
more of the other major European powers of the day.28 That 
27There is some scholarly disagreement on this point. 
David French represents the minority opinion when he suggests 
that 1688 constituted a successful invasion, even though 
William of Orange was invited to accede to the throne by an 
influential group representing the Protestant nobility. 
28David French, The British Way in Warfare. (London: Unwin 
Hyman, 199 0) p.xii. 
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Britain emerged victorious from nearly all of these 
conflicts testifies to both the diplomatic skills of her 
statesmen in the area of alliance-building, and the 
proficiency of her armed forces.  Nonetheless, it is the 
impressive battle record, "running like a bright thread 
through English history, "29 has left its indelible mark on 
the psyche of a nation: 
This freedom from foreign conquest since 
the Norman age has given to English 
history a quality not shared by the 
history of any other European people. 
At some time or other in the last 500 
years every great capital city in the 
western world except London has been 
occupxed by an enemy... 
The net result of this positive British military heritage 
has been a sustained "astonishing confidence in victory" on 
the part of the British people at large.31 
This is an even more remarkable character trait of the 
British when one considers the general disdain the public 
displayed toward the military until the nineteenth 
29Sherard Cowper-Coles, "From Defence to Security: British 
Policy in Transition", Survival,   Spring 1994, p. 146. 
30E.L. Woodward, "The English at War", The Character of 
England, edited by Ernest Barker, (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1947), p. 530. 
31Ibid, p. 547. 
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century.32  For hundreds of years prior to that, the fear of 
military despotism had made parliament suspicious of a 
standing army and unwilling to accept the establishment of 
barracks throughout the country.  Britain relied on the 
potential might of its militia as its homeguard, and only 
mustered a sizable force when there was a specific threat to 
confront abroad.  This lack of a truly professional army, in 
continental terms, resulted, at the beginning of nearly 
every war, in tales of expeditions hastily sent out, badly 
equipped, poorly led, and often serving no wide strategic 
purpose .33 
How ironic then that an unmilitary people with such an 
aversion to war and indifference to conquest abroad would 
end up amassing one of the great empires in modern times, 
while compiling an incredible military record along the way. 
It is not quite as surprising, however, after once again 
reflecting on the role that geography played in the 
development of the British Empire. 
The colonial period rewarded those nations with 
sufficient resources to undertake forays to distant lands. 
An essential part of the necessary imperialist capital was a 
32Ibid, p. 545. Woodward explains that a change in public 
perceptions regarding the military came about after the 
revelations of the intensity of the Boer War. 
33Ibid, pp. 536-7. 
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significant maritime capability.  Such a requirement fit 
nicely into British designs, for the British had always 
deemed a strong navy to be the most critical physical 
element of their island defense: 
Upon this control of the sea every 
argument about British defences 
ultimately turns.  This fact has never 
been forgotten-- indeed it has been too 
obvious to be ignored.34 
The dawn of the age of imperialism and the rise of the 
"Pax Britannica"35 therefore reflected a basic change in the 
defensive nature of British maritime power.  As the British 
Empire expanded, the Royal Navy became more important to the 
economic well-being of both the nation and the colonies.  As 
British interests became global, the sea lanes to the 
overseas possessions became more important.  The Royal Navy 
became a familiar sight in far off ports as Britain took an 
interest in the various strategic waterways of the world. 
Imperialism has been regarded by many as immoral and 
reprehensible, but the British saw this differently.  In 
fact, many of the British viewed their colonial activities 
as being quite the opposite. Many of the British believed 
that the areas falling under their  influence would benefit 
immensely from the exposure to British ideals: 
34 Ibid, p. 53! 
35David French refers to the pax Britannica as the period 
1815-1880. 
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Commerce, Christianity, and civilization 
were synonymous to the Victorians.  If 
missionaries brought Christianity to 
non-Christians they believed they would 
not only show them the path to eternal 
life but also the way to unlimited 
social and economic progress.36 
This British sense of mission, a belief in promoting 
religion, civilization and economic well-being, was alive in 
British imperial undertakings, and was influenced by the 
Puritan movement of the early seventeenth century which saw 
the persecuted Pilgrims "establish new lands beyond the sea" 
in a quest to "fulfill the mission that God had given 
them."37  Furthermore, the writings of Thomas Carlyle (1795- 
1881), Robert Seely (1834-95), Sir Charles Dilke (1843-1911) 
and Rudyard Kipling (1865-1936) all contained elements of 
the moral acceptance of the British "mission."38 
Moreover, the expanse of British territory and the 
continued successes in'the inevitable overseas wars that 
emerged in this period did nothing to shake the British 
attitude of confidence, but rather reinforced the belief 
that British military undertakings were doubtless for the 
good of all concerned: 
36French, p. 121. 
"Ezra Hoyt Byington, The Puritan as a Colonist and 
Reformer, (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1899), p. 5. 
38Hermann Kinder and Werner Hilgemann, The Anchor Atlas of 
World History, Volume II, (New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 103. 
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Critics of England may be exasperated by 
our bland acceptance of empire and 
repudiation of imperialism; nevertheless 
the significant fact is that this 
immense extension of their political 
sovereignty did not give the English a 
military turn of mind and that the 
English tradition, the 'deposit' of all 
these wars, has been one of defence 
T '39 against tyranny and aggression. 
And while it is obvious that not every people subjected 
(or, in some cases, subjugated) to British influence 
relished the experience, the important point for the 
purposes of this analysis is that the British believed in 
their self-assigned mission.  They considered themselves to 
be a good example of moral behavior and naturally felt that 
their own standards should be impressed upon those subject 
to their rule. 
This appeal to morality in external affairs of state 
also permeated the British political system and manifested 
itself mainly in the foreign policy objectives of the 
Liberal and Labour parties.  The question of morality in 
foreign affairs confronted British statesmen in many 
different forms, and many were able to elude it entirely. 
Yet one of the most famous Liberal Prime Ministers in 
British history--William Ewart Gladstone--confronted the 
issue head-on in a speech given in 1879, during his famous 
Midlothian campaign (he would become the Prime Minister in 
39Woodward, p. 531. 
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1880).  In the speech, Gladstone articulated his "six 
principles" of dealing with foreign policy issues.  The 
final two of these points concerned the "equality of 
nations" and the "love of freedom."40 
Gladstone deemed his fifth point--the equality of 
nations--to be of primary importance.  An excerpt of this 
point illustrates the type of idealistic convictions in 
British politics that would lead to a belief in the mission 
of international institutions such as the League of Nations 
and later, the U.N.  Gladstone stated that all nations 
should be treated as equals: 
.because, without recognizing that 
principle, there is no such thing as 
public right, and without public 
international right there is no 
instrument available for settling the 
transactions of mankind except material 
force.  Consequently the principle of 
equality among nations lies, in my 
opinion, at the very basis and root of a 
Christian civilization, and when that 
principle is compromised or abandoned, 
with it must depart our hopes of 
tranquility and of progress for 
mankind. . .41 
In discussing his sixth point, the "love for freedom" 
passage, Gladstone invoked the names of previous British 
statesmen who had achieved foreign policy successes while 
championing the cause of freedom: 
40Temperley and Penson, pp. 390-4 
4lIbid, pp. 393-4. 
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...the foreign policy of England should 
always be inspired by the love of 
freedom....in freedom you lay the 
firmest foundations both of loyalty and 
order; the firmest foundations for the 
development of individual character, and 
the best provision for the happiness of 
the nation at large.  In the foreign 
policy of this country the name of 
Canning will ever be honoured.  The name 
of Palmerston will be honoured by those 
who recollect the erection of the 
Kingdom of Belgium, and the union of the 
disjoined provinces of Italy. 42 
Prior to leaving the subject of morality in 
international politics altogether, it is important to note 
that there is a scholarly school of thought which suggests 
that two of the British traits already described-- the 
impregnability of the fortress England and the current of 
morality in foreign affairs--are inextricably linked: 
[Martin] Wight reached conclusions 
parallel to those of [Arnold] Wolfers 
regarding the importance of security as 
a virtual precondition for perceiving 
moral opportunities.  Wolfers attributed 
the differences he discerned between 
Anglo-American philosophies of 'choice' 
and continental European philosophies of 
'necessity' to the greater vulnerability 
to attack of the continental nations. 
An 'insular location', Wolfers 
maintained, gave Britain and the United 
States'freedom to remain aloof from many 
international struggles without a 
sacrifice of national security, and 
thus... the chance of keeping one's hands 
clean of many of the morally more 
42 Ibid, p. 393. 
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obnoxious vicissitudes of power politics 
43 to which others were subjected' 
Another characteristic of the British strategic culture 
developed as a consequence of the British imperial 
experience.  The British view events abroad with the 
perspective of having had world-wide interests for several 
generations.  Britain still views international events 
through the lens of a world power.  The British have a 
global perspective on foreign affairs that has its roots in 
the multitude of issues that faced the Empire in its heyday. 
That Britain was forced to retrench permanently from 
empire after World War Two is irrelevant.  The mere fact 
that Great Britain had amassed such an empire compelled it 
to forever be concerned with events in its former colonies 
that had acquired independence and nationhood. After having 
cultivated many of these nation-states, in a developmental 
sense, the British could physically depart from them, but 
never sever their historical and emotional ties to them. 
During the imperial period in particular, Britain would 
monitor affairs in these states, as well as in the 
surrounding areas of strategic importance, and intervene 
when it felt it appropriate to do so.  A propensity to act 
43David S. Yost, "Political Philosophy and the Theory of 
International Relations", International Affairs, April 1994, 
p. 279. 
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in such instances can be attributed, in large part, to a 
historical responsibility Britain felt for having been a 
part of the initial, modern development of a particular 
region. This continuing desire to influence matters "East of 
Suez" has lessened since World War Two but has been a 
fundamental pillar of British strategic culture, and one 
which can potentially still justify British intervention in 
many areas of the world today.44 
Most of the principles discussed thus far can stand 
alone as traits and some could apply to many different 
nations.  It is the specific combination of these national 
traits, however, in influencing decision-making, that helps 
to paint the portrait of the British national style in 
foreign affairs.  In other words, Great Britain has 
displayed consistent tendencies in the formulation of its 
national policies; and'these cardinal rules of British 
policy-making are founded upon basic concepts well-suited to 
ensure the security of the nation.  These constant threads 
in the British national strategy have thus been permanently 
woven into the fabric of the strategic culture. 
The first of these has to do with insuring the security 
of the fortress itself.  It has already been noted here that 
«See "British Defence Policy: The Long Recessional", by 
Laurence W. Martin, Adelphi Paper no. 61, 19 69, for a 
discussion of the waning ability of Great Britain to act »East 
of Suez." 
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Britain traditionally relied on its mastery of the waves to 
ensure its ultimate security for "only an island power could 
afford to lose every battle except the last."45 Nonetheless, 
Britain has always realized that certain conditions on the 
continent could put it in a position of having to test that 
theory, and London has therefore sought to prevent the 
emergence of those conditions. 
The conditions referred to above have to do with the 
occupation or conquering of the "low countries" of Belgium 
and the Netherlands.   These lands have not only provided 
key ports for British commerce, but also have been viewed, 
and rightly so, as staging areas that could facilitate an 
invasion across the channel by an aggressive continental 
power. Hence, British policy has been influenced 
accordingly: 
...our [British] attitude towards 
continental powers has always been 
vitally affected by their  attitude to 
the Low Countries....Alike in the days 
of Elizabeth, of William III, of 
Napoleon, of William II, of the Third 
Reich, we could not, and cannot view 
with indifference the control of Antwerp 
and Rotterdam, of the Dutch and Flemish 
coasts, by an alien Great Power....46 
45Woodward, p. 532. 
46Seton-Watson, p. 36.  In addition, the origins of this 
constant in British policy are discussed in more detail in the 
neutrality chapter  (one)  of Volume III of The Cambridge 
History of British Foreign Policy, edited by Sir A.W. Ward and 
G.P. Gooch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1923). 
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Winston Churchill's assessment of this historical continuity 
in British policy is prioritized slightly differently in 
that, in the following statement, he speaks first of 
opposing the resident continental aggressor before 
mentioning the Low Countries: 
For four hundred years the foreign 
policy of England has been to oppose the 
strongest, most aggressive, most 
dominating Power on the Continent, and 
particularly to prevent the Low 
Countries falling into the hands of such 
a power.47 
This leads directly to the next aspect of this 
traditional British policy in Europe--the desire to maintain 
a balance of power on the continent.  Great Britain has been 
acutely aware that the rise of a continental hegemon would 
be an immediate economic and security threat.  One of the 
first modern examples of this concern was the War of the 
Spanish Succession. 
In this conflict, which began on 15 May 1702, England, 
in the newly-formed Grand Alliance with Austria and the 
Dutch Republic, went to war against France for what would 
become a recurring theme, only to involve different nations, 
in the future: 
England's basic aims in entering the war 
were to secure her own safety, to 
prevent foreign interference in the 
4
'Winston S. Churchill, The Gathering Storm,  (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), p. 207. 
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revolution settlement, and to secure and 
maintain her trade abroad.  In order to 
achieve these goals, English statesmen 
believed that there must be a balance of 
power in Europe which would hinder any- 
one nation from interfering with the 
normal development of another 
nation....The major and immediate threat 
to obtaining this political solution in 
Europe was posed by the potential growth 
of French power through the inheritance 
of the Spanish throne by ^the French 
King's grandson, Philip.''° ■ 48 
Thus continued the established tradition in British 
history of maintaining a balance of power on the continent 
as the surest means to insure British economic and military 
security.  The British made a decision in each instance to 
maintain this coveted balance by siding with the seemingly 
weaker continental contingent.  Once again the themes of 
morality and idealism are present in Churchill's synopsis of 
this foreign policy tradition: 
...it would have been easy and must have 
been very tempting to join with the 
stronger and share the fruits of his 
conquest.  However, we always took the 
harder course, joined with the less 
strong Powers, made a combination among 
them, and thus defeated and frustrated 
the Continental military tyrant whoever 
he was, whatever nation he led.  Thus we 
preserved the liberties of Europe... and 
emerged...with the Low Countries safely 
protected in their independence.  Here 
48Paul Kennedy, Grand Strategies in War and Peace, (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 19. 
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is the wonderful unconscious tradition 
of British foreign policy.49 
Great Britain, the island nation, has always realized 
that its fate has been inextricably linked to events on the 
continent.  What is fascinating about British history, 
however, is the way in which the British have consistently 
been able to concern themselves with Europe only when the 
time was ripe, though some may argue overripe, for their 
intervention there.  This too was a strategic cultural 
pillar in their foreign policy-making charter--to avoid 
contractual  alliances on the continent, in order to insure 
the greatest possible flexibility when the moment came for 
action: 
The desire for isolation, the knowledge 
that it is impossible--these are the two 
poles between which the needle of the 
British compass continues to waver.50 
Gladstone referred to this aversion to standing 
alliances when listing his six principles of British foreign 
policy in 1879, referred to earlier.  Gladstone called them 
"entangling engagements" and submitted that their formation 
would increase commitments without increasing strength, 
which in essence would reduce the nation's strength.51 
49 Churchill, pp. 2 07-8 
50Seton- -Watson, p. 37. 
MTemperley and Penson, p. 392 
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In summary, the following strategic cultural 
continuities can be observed in the record of British 
diplomacy from 1702 onward: striving to maintain a balance 
of power in Europe; avoiding peacetime entangling alliances 
until they became wartime  necessities; opposing the rise of 
a hegemonic power on the continent; and preventing that same 
power from acquiring the Low Countries; were assimilated 
into an accepted paradigm of British foreign policy.  That 
this policy was maintained for the better part of three 
centuries makes it a fundamental part of the British 
strategic culture.  David French adequately summarizes this 
point: 
...British security rested on a stable 
balance of power in Europe.  Britain 
only intervened directly in continental 
affairs when the balance of power was in 
jeopardy because of the danger that one 
power or a coalition of powers was about 
to go to war .to impose their hegemony on 
their neighbours.  At other times 
Britain remained aloof from entangling 
European alliances so she could devote 
resources to expanding her interests 
outside Europe.  Quincy Wright argued 
that the pursuit of the balance of power 
became part of the doctrine of British 
foreign policy in the late seventeenth 
and early eighteenth centuries and was 
formally recognized as the basis of the 
Peace of Utrecht.  Neutrality at all 
other times was advantageous to Britain 
40 
because 'to be able to remain neutral is 
to hold the balance of power.'52 
A more recent addition to British strategic culture has 
been the aversion to appeasement in foreign affairs since 
the Munich debacle of 1938.  Some view Chamberlain's 
decisions in 1938 as part of a plan to "buy" Britain another 
year to prepare for war with the Germans.  Yet another 
account of the pre-World War Two years depicts Chamberlain 
as a leader attempting to avoid war altogether by treading 
lightly with Nazi Germany, despite increasing evidence of 
its brutality and lawlessness.53 
Appeasement in foreign policy had been nothing new to 
British statesmen on the eve of World War Two.  In fact they 
had employed it to their advantage before.  But its 
subsequent and dramatic failure in containing German 
ambitions after 1938 resulted in it no longer being 
considered a viable option for the future: 
Its (appeasement's) success in the five 
years between 1902 and 1907 enabled 
Britain to wage a war which brought her 
to the peak of her Imperial power.  Its 
failure in the five years between 1934 
and 1939 resulted in a conflict which 
"French, pp. xii-xiii. The Peace of Utrecht was the 
settlement after the War of the Spanish Succession discussed 
earlier.  The Quincy Wright statement is from his book, A 
Study of War, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19420, 
Vol. I, p. 636. 
"Martin Gilbert and Richard Gott, The Appeasers, (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin Company, 1963), pp. xi-xiv. 
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led to the disintegration of her Empire 
and which might, but for mistakes of her 
adversaries, have resulted in her own 
subjugation to an alien and very much 
less tolerable imperial rule.54 
The last tenet of British strategic culture to be 
discussed here is also a relatively recent development on 
the British diplomatic scene.  This is the "special 
relationship"55 that has existed between the United States 
and Great Britain in this century.  Scarcely evident in the 
inter-war years because of American isolationism,56 this 
unofficial partnership intensified during the struggle 
against Nazi Germany, and then continued throughout the Cold 
War.  The unique cooperation between the two nations in the 
area of political-military affairs was most prominent in, 
but not limited to, the areas of naval operations, nuclear 
weapons, and intelligence matters.57 
Paul Kennedy suggests that it was Churchill who first 
cultivated the relationship through his dealings and 
correspondence with Roosevelt prior to the American entrance 
54Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment,  (London: 
Temple Smith, 1972), p. 29. 
55See The 'Special Relationship' Anglo-American Relations 
Since 1945, edited by William Roger Louis and Hedley Bull 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986) for a complete discussion of 
the evolution of this "alliance." 
■'"'Louis and Bull, p. 3. 
57Louis  and Bull,   especially pp.   117-28  and  151-9. 
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into the war.58  Likewise, Kissinger suggests that American 
entrance into the war alongside the allies had much to do 
with the "strong cultural ties between England and America, 
for which there was no counterpart in U.S.-German 
relations."^ 
After the end of the war the relationship prospered in 
terms of political rhetoric praising its existence on both 
sides of the Atlantic;60 but more importantly it has had 
concrete benefits to both sides.  Kissinger even suggests 
that the Suez Crisis of 1956 had a solidifying effect on the 
relationship in that Britain.  Humbled by the diplomatic 
humiliation at the hands of the non-supportive U.S. 
government during the crisis, Britain accepted de facto her 
junior role in the alliance and opted to strengthen the 
partnership with America so as to gain maximum influence 
over future decisions that would essentially be made in 
Washington.61 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the reunification 
of an economically powerful Germany may prove yet to be the 
greatest test of the strength of the Anglo-American 
58Kennedy, p. 52. 
59Henry  Kissinger,  Diplomacy,  (New  York:  Simon  and 
Schuster, 1994), p. 43. 
60Louis and Bull, p. 1. 
6iKissinger, pp. 548 and 597. 
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friendship.  Whether Britain remains America's preeminent 
political-military partner is still in question. Today's 
Balkan conflict may hold part of the answer. 
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III. BRITAIN'S HISTORICAL INTERESTS IN THE BALKANS 
A.  INTRODUCTION 
British military history in general conjures familiar 
images to those with a rudimentary knowledge of the 
important events that marked it.  Decisive naval battles 
with long-time rival France come to mind, as do more recent 
struggles this century against expansionist Germany.  Yet 
the annals of Great Britain, and British foreign policy, 
have been colored by events from all corners of the globe. 
The Balkan Peninsula is but a single region where British 
interests have lain over the years but, as one vital part of 
the complicated Eastern Question, its historical 
significance in influencing British policy is undisputed: 
...the Eastern Question, which in its 
later phase may be defined as the 
problem of how to fill the vacuum 
created by the shrinkage and decay of 
the once conquering Ottoman Empire.  To 
those that consider that undue space has 
been accorded to the Eastern Question in 
[British] history, or to those  who 
hesitate to include it among the 
catalogue of British interests, it 
should be sufficient to rejoin that no 
less than eleven times in the last 
hundred years were we involved in major 
international crises  owing to 
complications in the Near East.  Neither 
the Iberian nor the Italian Peninsula, 
neither Germany nor the Hapsburg 
Monarchy, have proved to be so 
persistently and inextricably interwoven 
with every imaginable issue of foreign 
policy, as have the issues involved in 
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the fate of Turkey and her former 
vassals .62 
A concise examination of British involvement in Balkan 
affairs follows.  It will be seen that Great Britain's 
historical behavior there has been the result of a 
combination of many factors, depending upon the specific 
period.  Moreover, when determining British policies in the 
Balkans, statesmen have always kept traditional national 
interests in mind but have fallen prey to the influence of 
strategic cultural considerations on several occasions. 
B.  THE RISE OF THE PAX BRITANNICA 
The [Balkan] peninsula is a crossroads 
between Europe, Asia, and Africa.  Here 
the peoples and cultures of three 
continents have met and mingled, or 
clashed and conquered.  The major powers 
of each historical epoch have made their 
influence felt here and have left their 
mark upon the peoples.  The great 
imperial powers of the past--Greeks, 
Romans, Turks, Venetians, Austrians, 
Germans, British, and Russians--all in 
their turn have dominated or sought to 
dominate the area.63 
That the Jelavichs chose to omit the "Soviets" from 
this group probably had more to do with their prefacing the 
collection with the word "imperial" than to any oversight on 
their part, for the Soviet "Empire" definitely extended into 
62Seton-Watson,   pp.   648-9. 
63Charles and Barbara Jelavich,   The Balkans,    (New Jersey: 
Prentice  Hall,    1965),   pp.   2-3. 
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the Balkans as well.      Nonetheless, this ominous 
assessment of Balkan history reveals that the nations and 
peoples of the Balkans have been subjugated by numerous 
powers through the centuries in part due to the mere 
misfortune of their geographic placement in the world. 
If for no other immediate reason then, the major 
historical world powers have been able to conveniently 
justify their interest in the Balkans based on its strategic 
location alone.  Great Britain is certainly no different in 
this regard.  The Balkans became an area of significance for 
British foreign policy during the age of imperialism, and 
more specifically, the rise of the "Pax Britannica.',64 
During this period the British established a global 
empire that became the envy of the other powers.  In 1793 
Britain possessed twenty-six colonies.  By 1815 she had 
forty-three and in the next fifty years the empire expanded 
by an average of 100,000 square miles each year!65  The 
Royal Navy facilitated this impressive territorial growth 
yet there existed certain areas where the maintenance of 
secure overland commerce routes was as important to the 
British economy as the protection of the sea lanes.  The 
64French, p. 119. French lists the era of Pax Britannica 
as existing from 1815-1880. 
"French, p. 124. 
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Balkans proved to one such area and British interest in the 
region magnified accordingly. 
C.  THE EASTERN QUESTION 
In addition, the Balkans became a source of concern to 
Great Britain in this time frame for another reason that was 
more political in nature.  Great Britain and the other great 
European powers of the day--Austria, France, and Russia-- 
began concerning themselves with the "Eastern Question. "66 
At the heart of this Eastern question was the impending 
collapse of the centuries-old Ottoman Empire. 
By the late eighteenth century it became apparent that 
the central government in Constantinople was beginning to 
lose its political grasp on some areas of its vast holdings. 
Ottoman power and prestige had peaked centuries before 
during the reign of Suleiman the Magnificent (1520-1566). 
However, following his regime, the Empire was plagued by a 
succession of ineffectual rulers and the government began to 
weaken from the center.  The decline in the central 
government was accompanied by a gradual increase in 
66Norman Rich, Why the Crimean War? A Cautionary Tale, 
(Hanover: University Press of New England), 1965, pp. 20-21, 
The term Eastern Question was used by statesmen of the 
nineteenth century to refer to problems in the Balkans and the 
Near East. There was no uniform definition of the 
geographical area covered by the Eastern Question, but there 
was general agreement that it embraced the Balkan and Black 
sea regions, Asia Minor as far as the Caucasus Mountains in 
the east and the Red Sea in the west, and the eastern part of 
North Africa, Egypt in particular. 
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corruption throughout the entire administration, as well as 
a deterioration in the once-feared Ottoman Armies.67 
This loosening of authority within the Ottoman Empire 
could not have come at a worse juncture for the reigning 
Sultans of the period.  The French Revolution had brought a 
new spirit to Europe and the ideology of the time, fostered 
through a literary and cultural awakening, gave a 
theoretical justification to Balkan rebellion.  The forces 
of Nationalism and Liberalism set Europe alight with 
revolutionary fire and the flames were to engulf the Balkans 
as well.68 
Independence movements began to emerge in several areas 
under Ottoman control.  In general, Britain would try to 
support such movements as much as possible given the 
prevailing circumstances of the day.  The explicit support 
and sympathy that the British displayed toward the emerging 
liberal movements reflected a commonly held belief in 
Britain that the self-determination of peoples and respect 
for individual rights were the cornerstones of civilized 
societies.  This idealistic attitude would not, however, 
eliminate the requirement for British statesmen to view each 
67Jelavich and Jelavich, pp. 25-31. 
68Ibid, pp. 44-6. 
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such situation with an eye toward overall strategic British 
interests in the subject region. 
Serbia was first to gain its autonomy from the Ottoman 
Empire in 1815.  This was the Serbs' second attempt at 
emancipation in that century, the first one having been 
crushed by the Turks in 1813.  Russian support proved to be 
the decisive difference in Serbia's second quest for semi- 
independence. With Napoleon having met his final demise, 
Russia was in a much better position to act as the self- 
proclaimed sponsor and protector of Balkan Orthodox 
Christianity (a reason that Russia would perpetually cite 
for future intervention in the Balkans as well). 
As a result of Russian posturing during the second 
Serbian uprising, the Sultan capitulated and Serbia became 
an autonomous state within the Ottoman Empire.  This event 
transpired with little repercussion throughout the remainder 
of Europe, however, as the existence of landlocked Serbia 
appeared to be no threat to the interests of the other 
powers .69 
The second rebellious movement, however, took place in 
Greece beginning in April of 1821, and marked the first 
serious incursion into Balkan politics by Great Britain. 
The ironic twist in this undertaking was that although 
6qIbid, pp. 35-48. 
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Britain would cite what would become its consistent reason 
for concern over Balkan affairs--free and safe access to the 
Eastern Mediterranean--they would also find themselves, in 
this first Balkan entanglement, aligned with the very nation 
whose influence in the area they would spend the rest of the 
century trying to counter--Tsarist Russia. 
Great Britain's interests in the Eastern Mediterranean 
centered around free and safe passage through the area as 
opposed outright control of the seas there.  The British saw 
parts of their Empire in the Middle East, and more 
importantly India, as threatened if any power should exert 
maritime predominance in the Eastern waters.  During a 
stalemate in the conflict, Egypt appeared to be in a 
position to do just that when it responded to the Ottoman 
call for help in suppressing the rebellious Greeks.  The 
Egyptian forces scored immediate successes against the 
Greeks and began to acquire key islands in the Aegean.  But 
because neither the British nor the Russians wished Egypt to 
dominate the Eastern Mediterranean, the two governments 
cooperated in an effort to counter the Egyptian presence.70 
They did this in dramatic fashion in September of 1827, 
when, after having solicited the assistance of France as 
70 Ibid, p. 49. 
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well, the newly combined, three-nation allied fleet set up a 
blockade to prevent Egyptian and Turkish vessels from 
advancing on Greek-rebel held territory.  Shortly 
thereafter, in October, the allied fleet confronted their 
Turko-Egyptian counterpart force in Navarino Bay. 
Predictably, a battle ensued culminating in a victory for 
the European allies with fifty-seven ships of the Turkish- 
led fleet on the bottom and over eight thousand lives 
lost.71 
The fallout from this naval battle was responsible for 
the advent of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828.  Public opinion 
in Constantinople, enraged over the incident at sea, 
especially since there had been no declarations of war among 
any of the nations involved, forced the Sultan to confront 
the Allies. Most of the ensuing Ottoman anger was directed 
toward the Russians--who were viewed by Constantinople as 
having led the allied effort--and a land war commenced 
between Russia and the Ottoman Turks.72 
The Tsar's forces prevailed on the battlefield and the 
resultant Treaty of Adrianople in 1829 gave Russia increased 
influence of a protective nature in the Balkans, mainly in 
"Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans: Eighteenth and 
Nineteenth Centuries, Volume I, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1983), p. 226. 
72Ibid, p. 227. 
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the Danubian Principalities.  The Tsar, however, deferred to 
his earlier allies with regard to the resolution of the 
Greek situation.  Thus the follow-on London Protocol of 1830 
enabled Britain to curtail any further Russian political 
gains in the region by declaring Greece to be a fully 
independent state.73        The alternative would have been 
an autonomous Greek nation, under the administration of the 
Porte74 but with security guarantees from Russia; such an 
arrangement was viewed by the British as an undue extension 
of Russian influence in the Balkans, all the more so because 
of Greece's strategic maritime location.  And so by 1833, 
with an appointed monarch of Bavarian descent on the throne, 
the modern Greek nation was born.75 
Of singular significance among the many events that 
unfolded during both the Greek Revolution and Russo-Turkish 
War was the conscious knowledge on the part of the Tsar that 
his successful alliance with Great Britain only came about 
because of the coalescing interests of the two nations at 
the time.  Nicholas I and his ministers realized that the 
73Jelavich and Jelavich, pp. 47-53. 
74Jelavich and Jelavich, p.35. The Ottoman Empire was 
regularly referred to in diplomatic correspondence as the 
Porte. The Sublime Porte was the designation for the Gateway 
leading to the building which contained the principal offices 
of the government in Constantinople. 
75 Barbara Jelavich, vol. I, pp. 227-229 
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arrangement with the British had been temporary, and that 
the surest way to erase their recent cooperation would be by 
menacing British interests as Egypt had just done: 
The Russian leaders were aware that 
Constantinople could not be occupied 
even if the Russian Armies were in a 
position to take the city.  Despite the 
fact that they had cooperated with 
Britain and France in the Greek 
Question, they fully recognized the 
limits that had to be placed on their 
ambitions .76 
This infatuation that the British had for 
Constantinople was not over the city itself, but rather the 
Straits that it commanded.  Once again the chief British 
fear was the potential threat to the Eastern Mediterranean 
that could be posed by a hostile Russia in possession of the 
Dardenelles and Bosphorus waterways.  As such, provisions 
dealing with the straits were contained in nearly every 
major European Treaty in the nineteenth century.77 
Equally important from the British cultural perspective 
was the sympathy that was generated within the British 
public for the cause of the Greek rebels.  Aside from the 
76Ibid, p. 227. 
77Temperly and Penson, pp.119, 123, 135, 331, 469, 362-4, 
381-2, 454-61. Also see J.A.R. Marriot, The Eastern Question: 
An Historical Study in European Diplomacy, (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1917) , p. 277. The British aim with respect 
to the Straits reflected the ancient rule of the Ottoman 
Empire according to which the Dardenelles and Bosphorus were 
closed to foreign ships of the line, so long as the Porte was 
at peace. 
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moral righteousness of the Greek rebels' cause, there 
existed in Britain a romantic Philhellenic78 movement that 
exerted a substantial influence on the political leaders and 
educated public.  The Greek revolutionaries were portrayed 
as the direct descendants of the mythological heroes of the 
ancient world while the Ottoman forces were thought of as 
brutal barbarians who were inflicting unprovoked terror on 
innocent and civilized victims.79 
So while access to, and safe passage through the waters 
of the Eastern Mediterranean was seen as a tangible British 
interest, necessary to safeguard commerce and colonies, the 
morality of the Greek movement toward self-determination 
also appealed to the British in a cultural sense. 
Consequently, the British decision to intervene in the Greek 
revolution can be viewed as a situation where both 
fundamental national interests and strategic cultural 
considerations called for similar policy.  Unfortunately for 
British statesmen this pattern would not repeat itself in 
every future Balkan scenario. 
78Webster's Collegiate Dictionary (Tenth Edition) defines 
Philhellenic as being an admiration of Greece or the Greeks. 
This movement centered mainly on the cultural contribution 
that ancient Greece had made to humanity in the shape of 
literature, philosophy, the arts, science and architecture. 
79Ibid, p.224. 
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D.  RUSSIA AND BRITAIN AND THE CRIMEAN WAR 
A shift in the paradigm of British strategic thinking 
occurred as a result of the Russo-Turkish War of 1828. 
France, Britain's traditional enemy over the previous two 
centuries, was viewed with less concern since the defeat of 
Napoleon and the establishment of the Concert of Europe at 
the Congress of Vienna in 1815.  At first the British 
approved of the arrangement for the mechanics of the Concert 
seemed suited to blunt any attempt at hegemony on the 
continent while still allowing Britain some freedom to act 
if the balance of power prove threatened. 
But the new threat to British security now lay further 
inland as the Eastern Question became more pronounced with 
the defeat of the Ottomans in the Russo-Turkish war.  It 
became evident to Great Britain that the maintenance of the 
Ottoman Empire, albeit in an already weakened condition, 
would be critical to preventing a Russian domination of the 
Balkans and the Near East: 
...in the late 1820s the French bogey 
began to be replaced by the Russian 
bogey.  The government in London feared 
an external threat and suffered 
nightmares that if Turkey collapsed 
under Tsarist pressure or if Persia 
fell under her domination, Russian 
troops might march down the Euphrates, 
establish a naval base at the head of 
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the Persian Gulf and cut Britain's 
communications with India.80 
This fear of Russian expansion was to become a guiding 
principle for British foreign policy in the Balkans 
thereafter and one of the main reasons that Britain became 
involved in the disagreements between Turkey and Russia that 
eventually led to the Crimean War in 1854.  Although not a 
battle over the Balkans per se, Russian occupation of 
territory there was one the catalysts of hostilities: 
The Aberdeen government went to war 
against Russia in March 1854 because the 
Russians had occupied the Danubian 
principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia 
and because their attack on the Turkish 
fleet at Sinope in November 1853 had 
demonstrated that Russia was now a major 
naval power that threatened British 
naval supremacy in the Eastern 
Mediterranean.  The government sought to 
destroy Russian naval power in the Black 
Sea and to prevent the Russians 
advancing farther in the Balkans.81 
Meanwhile, to assist in drumming up public support at 
home, the opposition to Russia was also portrayed by the 
government as a moral struggle.  In a speech before the 
House of Lords in March of 1854, Foreign Minister Clarendon 
spoke of checking the unjust aggression of Russia and 
securing a peace honorable to Turkey.  By this time the 
Russians had already scored a lopsided naval victory at 
Trench, p.123. 
'ibid, p. 132. 
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Sinope over a severely outgunned Turkish expedition.  This 
"massacre," as it was then called by the British press, 
stoked the war fires in Britain.82 
Clarendon continued in his speech by depicting the 
upcoming struggle as one of civilization against barbarism, 
and submitted that if Britain did not intervene, other 
nations might suffer the same fate as Poland had at the 
hands of the Russians in 1830.83  It seems as though the 
historic British labelling of barbarians in the Near East 
varied at times, depending on which nation threatened their 
interests there. 
The Crimean War ended with a victory by the allied 
coalition of Britain, France, Austria and Turkey, yet Russia 
was not decisively defeated in the war despite a staggering 
number of casualties, even by Russian standards. 
Nonetheless, the overall poor performance of the Russian 
military fostered a comprehensive social and economic reform 
movement by the Tsar's government which would lead to a more 
modern "western" army in the future.84 
82Harold Temperly, England and the Near East, the Crimea, 
(London: Longmans, Green and Co., LTD., 1936), pp. 370-5. 
83Rich, pp. 107-8. This was in reference to the Tsar's 
brutal repression of a revolt in Poland during that year. 
84 Rich, pp. 206-7. 
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The Ottoman Empire had thus been preserved, through the 
efforts of the allied coalition in the Crimean War, but its 
ability to hold together indefinitely was in serious doubt. 
British statesmen realized that the Ottoman Empire was badly 
in need of reform in order to both placate the growing 
nationalist movements within it and improve its reputation 
abroad.  Consequently, the British government was behind 
several liberal decrees announced by the Porte in both 1839 
and 1856.  The British hoped that "reform within the Ottoman 
Empire would make the state acceptable to all its subjects 
and that it would remain as a bulwark against Russian 
expansion." 85  Yet after centuries of oppressive rule in 
the Balkans under the Sultans, and in light of the recent 
successful independence movements there, more violent 
revolts against Ottoman rule in the Balkans proved to be but 
twenty years away. 
E.  REALPOLITIK ARRIVES 
The Russian defeat in the Crimean War also signified a 
collapse in the Concert of Europe,86 for Russia had been the 
85Jelavich and Jelavich, pp. 50-3. 
86French, p. 122. Never a staunch supporter of pre- 
existing treaties that bound nations to predetermined actions 
in the event of a conflict, Britain was nonetheless a 
"signatory" to the Concert of Europe originally, but withdrew 
in the early 1820s when the Eastern powers tried to use it as 
a vehicle to repress liberal and nationalist movements on the 
continent. 
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main agent of enforcement during its operative period. 
The stretch of comparable peace on the continent from 1815 
was thus terminated and followed by a period of relative  . 
chaos which completely reorganized the European order by 
18 71, with Germany emerging as the strongest power.88 
Thus began an era when European politics would be 
dominated by calculations of raw power and the national 
interest, or in a word, Realpolitik.     German Chancellor Otto 
von Bismarck dominated continental diplomacy circles as 
alliances and counter-alliances became the order of the day 
for ensuring national security.  Despite this new diplomatic 
strategy, and the emergence of a powerful, unified Germany, 
Great Britain adhered to her age old policies with regard to 
affairs across the channel, determined to avoid the 
commitments of an alliance unless one became necessary to 
confront a specific threat. 
Concurrently, while remaining aloof from any 
contractual obligations, the British continued to monitor 
Russian advances in the Balkans and Central Asia with 
concern.  There was a rise in popularity of the Panslavic 
movement in Russia and the Balkans shortly after the 
87Ibid, pp. 3-4. 
88Kissinger, p. 119. 
89Ibid, p. 145. 
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conclusion of the Crimean War.90 This coincided nicely with 
Russia's previous declarations about safeguarding Christian 
Orthodoxy in the region, enabling Russia to conveniently use 
this more comprehensive cultural argument from then on to 
justify its intervention in Balkan affairs. 
In 1875 a Balkan uprising once again focused 
international attention on the troubled region.  An 
insurrection against Turkish rule in Hercegovina began in 
July of that year.  An identical uprising then occurred 
almost immediately in neighboring Bosnia.  Owing in part to 
the known difficulty in fighting in those regions, the 
reigning Sultan accepted the recommendation of the European 
powers and attempted to pacify the insurgents with decrees 
that would meet their demands.  These were summarily 
rejected by the rebels who by now had little faith in 
declarations from Constantinople.  Further attempts by the 
foreign governments to mediate among the parties proved 
futile and by May of the following year the conflict had 
spread to Bulgaria.91 
90Panslavic doctrine called for the removal of all Slavic 
people from foreign, that is, Ottoman or Hapsburg, rule and 
their organization into a federation of states in which Russia 
would take the leading role.  See Barbara Jelavich, vol. I, 
p.353 . 
"Barbara Jelavich, vol. I, p. 3 54. 
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In the succeeding two months, Serbia and Montenegro 
joined in the fray which then forced the Ottoman Turks to 
either take the offensive or risk losing virtually all their 
territory in the Balkans.  The Turks attacked ferociously, - 
crushing the rebellion in Bulgaria in brutal fashion and 
stories of Turkish atrocities filtered throughout Europe. 
Simultaneously, Austria-Hungary and Russia discussed 
possible intervention in the conflict, as well as 
arrangements to be made at its conclusion.  Russia at first 
refrained from involvement, but by the first of September, 
the Serbs had been completely defeated and sentiment in 
Russia for a confrontation with the Porte was growing.92 
Russia made plans for war with Turkey but sought a 
final diplomatic settlement first, at British urging, 
through a conference of all the great powers at 
Constantinople in December of 1876.  The powers presented 
the Turkish contingent with a series of reforms that 
included the partition of certain Balkan territories and the 
implementation of liberal policies throughout the region. 
The Porte responded by drawing up a new, supposedly liberal, 
constitution for the entire Ottoman Empire that would negate 
the need for the demands presented to them at the 
conference.  Consequently, the Ottoman Regime rejected the 
92Ibid, p. 356. 
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entire conference as being an unnecessary undertaking, and 
it closed, on all accounts a failure, in January of the 
following year.93 
After soliciting the conditional neutrality94 of 
Austria and Great Britain, so as to preclude another Crimean 
episode, Russia declared war on Turkey on April 24, 1877, 
ehe government finally yielding to the pressures of the 
Panslav circles.  After a difficult struggle, the Tsar's 
forces appeared to be poised to lay siege on the Ottoman 
capital.  Fearing this emerging exigency, Britain dispatched 
a fleet, complete with landing force, to the Sea of Marmora 
to display their traditional, adamant stance opposing an 
outright Russian conquest of the city.  The presence of the 
British forces, coupled with the Tsar's Army having been 
exhausted and decimated by casualties and disease, prompted 
the Russians to convince the even less fortunate Turkish 
side to come to terms in an armistice in January of 1878.95 
93 Ibid, p. 356 
94Ward and Gooch, pp. 116-7. Austria-Hungary was promised 
Bosnia-Hercegovina as spoils in return for her neutrality, 
while Britain was reassured that Russia would, as usual, not 
threaten to undermine the maritime balance in the region by 
occupying Constantinople and dominating the Dardenelles or by 
threatening the Suez Canal area. 
^George F. Kennan, The Decline of Bismarck's European 
Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), p. 36. 
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The terms of any settlement were a concern to the 
British as their fleet had demonstrated, but strict 
opposition to Russia was not as popular at home as it had 
been during the Crimean period, when British national 
interests seemingly fell neatly in line with their moral 
convictions.  Britain still sought to contain Russian 
expansion in the Balkans but she could, no longer do so by 
painting the Russians as the barbarians. 
Russia was now associated with the self-determining 
Panslav cause which elicited support among Britain at large. 
Conversely, the almost continual promise of reforms from the 
central government in Constantinople had never really 
materialized in practice over the years despite British 
prodding and urging; this combined with the recent specter 
of the "Bulgarian Horrors"96 hampered the British government 
in any policy that would continue to support Turkish rule in 
the Balkans.97  For its part, the Porte had thought it held 
"a permanent lien on British sympathy and support," and 
%
 The Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy- 
Volume III edited by Sir A.W. Ward and G.P. Gooch, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1923), p. 105, including footnote. 
William Ewart Gladstone, four-time Prime Minister of Great 
Britain (1868-74, 1880-5, 1886, 1892-4) published a pamphlet 
in 1876 entitled Bulgarian Horrors in which he described the 
atrocities committed by the Turks in putting down the 
Bulgarian revolt. 
97K.W.B. Middleton, Britain and Russia: An Historical 
Essay, (London: Hutchinson and Co., 1947), p. 65. 
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never fully realized that this had been contingent on the 
Ottoman Empire progressing toward acceptable civilized 
behavior, even in war."8 
F.  THE CONGRESS OF BERLIN 
After the Armistice was concluded on January 31, 
Russian and Ottoman representatives met to negotiate a 
treaty to finalize their agreements.  This effort produced 
the Treaty of San Stefano on March 3, 1878.  This treaty was 
contested by Great Britain  and Austria-Hungary as soon as 
its contents were known.  Austria was shocked that while the 
treaty predictably called for a rearrangement of the borders 
of several Balkan states, it did not honor certain 
assurances that Russia had provided the Hapsburg government 
before the war. 
In Britain, a Cabinet Committee had met and issued a 
report for government circulation which protested several 
tenets of the treaty.  Of prime concern to the British 
officials were the extension of a dominating Russian 
influence into the Balkans through the expansion of several 
of the Christian states (most notably Bulgaria) and the 
98Ward and Gooch, p. 107. 
"Barbara Jelavich, vol. I, pp. 358-360 
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stationing of Russian troops there, as well as new rules 
concerning the use of the Straits by ships of the line.100 
As tensions mounted between Britain, Russia and Austria 
in the spring of 1878, it was decided that representatives 
from the countries should meet to discuss a resolution to 
the unpopular Treaty of San Stefano.  The composition of 
this meeting then evolved into a comprehensive conference of 
all the major powers of Europe at which the contents of all 
existing treaties would be examined and considered for 
revision.   The result was the  Congress of Berlin, held in 
the new German capital on June 13 of 1878. 
The voluntary host of the affair, German Chancellor 
Otto von Bismarck, described his role of mediator at the 
conference to be that of an "honest broker."  In truth, the 
war scare had defused somewhat prior to the opening of the 
event due to secret negotiations between Britain, Russia, 
and Austria that already redressed informally several 
portions of the Treaty of San Stefano.101 
Nonetheless, these points had to be finalized, and 
moreover, the Congress was an elaborate historical event 
which saw a formidable gathering of European statesmen 
100Foundations of British Foreign Policy, edited by Harold 
Temperly and Lillian M. Penson, (London: Frank Cass & Co., 
1938), pp. 367-372. 
l01Kissinger, p. 154. 
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address numerous issues.  When the conference had ended, 
Great Britain emerged as one of the "victors" without having 
taken part in any fighting.  Foreign warships were precluded 
from transiting the Straits (a continued British goal to 
prevent Russian maritime influence in the Eastern 
Mediterranean); the British pressured the Ottoman government 
to relinquish control of the island of Cyprus; and Russian 
influence in the Balkans was reduced.  The latter was 
achieved mainly through the substantial reduction in the 
size of the state of greater Bulgaria (as compared to the 
one created at San Stefano) . 102 
After the Congress of Berlin, British interest in the 
Balkans waned for two primary reasons.  The first was that 
British fears of Russian domination in the region did not 
come to pass as they had envisioned.  The nationalist 
undercurrent in the Balkans had by this time weakened the 
Orthodox and Panslavic ties that Russia felt with the Balkan 
states.  In addition, the representation of the small Balkan 
nations at Berlin (entrusted to Russia) had been virtually 
dismissed in importance in the talks among the great powers. 
These facts became apparent shortly after the conference 
when a Bulgarian nationalist movement began to make efforts 
toward redressing the Berlin division of their country. 
102 Barbara Jelavich, vol. I, p. 361, 
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During a complicated, domestic political upheaval that 
lasted through the decade of the 1880s, Bulgaria absorbed 
the newly created Eastern Rumelia to its south.  Russian 
subversion during the course of the crisis irritated 
Bulgarian nationalists, and caused permanent damage to their 
loyalty to the Tsar.  And although normal relations with 
Moscow were restored by 1896, earlier British fears of 
Bulgaria becoming a huge Russian puppet state were 
temporarily assuaged, allowing the British to happily 
retreat from the many more convoluted Balkan political and 
territorial disputes that would stem from the indifference 
toward Balkan nationalism displayed by the powers at the 
Congress of Berlin.103 
The second, and perhaps most important reason, for 
British retrenchment from the Balkans was that after the 
opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the Balkans were no 
longer as important to British colonial and commercial 
concerns.  India, the "crown jewel" of the British Empire, 
could now be reached expeditiously from the sea, reinforcing 
the importance of the Eastern Mediterranean, but relegating 
all other overland routes to a lesser category. 
Moreover, in succeeding decades Britain would fear a 
more direct threat to India in the form of a Russian land 
103Ibid, pp. 366-373. 
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invasion through Afghanistan.  Ironically, it has been 
suggested that Russia used this (perceived) threat to India 
as "a useful means of deterring the British from 
interfering with Russian interests elsewhere, especially in 
the Balkans."1M Nonetheless, it would be decades before 
Great Britain would again concern itself with Balkan 
affairs--the Eastern Question, though not removed from the 
hearts of British liberals, would not capture as much 
attention in foreign affairs as it had earlier in the 
century. 
G.  THE END OF ISOLATION 
The period between the Congress of Berlin and 189 0 is 
generally viewed as an isolationist period in British 
foreign policy in regard to European affairs.  Bismarck was, 
however, very active in this period (until his dismissal in 
1890) in constructing alliances to safeguard the security of 
the Germany he had successfully united.  Britain avoided 
entanglement in these accords despite direct attempts by 
Germany to engage her.105 
Instead the British focused their attention mostly on 
their vast possessions across the globe, while continuing to 
104Middleton, pp. 73-74 
105Ward and Gooch, Volume III, 1866-1919, pp. 143-145, 
245-6. 
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pursue her policy of "splendid isolation"106 with regard to 
European affairs.  The net result was British intervention 
in crises in both hemispheres through 1899, but, it would 
not be until the turn of the century that British concerns 
would again turn toward events on the Balkan peninsula.107 
While the coming of the new century saw continued 
conflict in the Balkans, it witnessed another dramatic 
transformation in British foreign policy.  This attitude 
change by British statesmen had its origins in the rupturing 
of the alliance system that German Chancellor Bismarck had 
so painstakingly constructed.  Bismarck was dismissed from 
office in 1890 and shortly thereafter Germany refused to 
renew its Reinsurance Treaty with Russia--the most basic 
pillar of Bismarck's earlier foreign collaborations.  This 
opened the way for Russia to seek security in the form of 
another alliance arrangement since the new German statesmen 
106The phrase "splendid isolation" is used here because of 
its historical acceptance. It was coined by Prime Minister- 
Lord Salisbury-in an 1896 speech but has been used out of 
context through the years. For a complete explanation see 
volume IV, pp. 85-6, of the Life of Marquis of Salisbury, by 
his daughter, Lady Gwendolen Cecil (London: Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1931). 
107Ward and Gooch, Volume III, pp. 237-242. In what was 
a relatively minor affair, British Prime Minister Salisbury 
mediated peace discussions after the Graeco-Turkish War of 
1897. In addition, in order to facilitate the peace, British 
troops were used to evict Turkish soldiers from Crete with the 
approval of the other great powers and with the direct 
assistance of France and Italy. 
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had chosen to instead maintain the Triple Alliance of 1882, 
which included Italy and Austria as the other signatories. 
Franco-Russian relations had improved greatly during the 
1880s and after the diplomatic snub from Germany in 1890, 
the Russians wasted little time cultivating their new 
relationship with France.  By 1894, Russia and France 
concluded a military pact and Bismarck's nightmare of a two- 
front war came one step closer to Berlin.108 
Meanwhile Great Britain came out of her diplomatic 
dormancy largely due to the announcement by the German 
Kaiser in 189 6 that his nation was about to embark upon a 
great naval construction campaign.  This proclamation was 
seen in London as an immediate threat to Great Britain in 
that she regarded the seas as her domain, much the way 
certain continental powers saw some inland areas as their 
spheres of influence.  Moreover any power possessing a navy- 
equal in might to the British and capable of supporting a 
sizable landing force automatically became a potential 
threat to British security in the event of a European 
108A detailed study of the background of these events is 
contained within The Decline of Bismarck's European Order, 
Franco-Russian Relations, 1875-1890, by George F. Kennan, 
(Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1979). For an 
abbreviated version see Gordon Craig, Europe Since 1815, 
(Orlando: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1961), pp. 305-6. 
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conflict.  The naval issue would dominate relations with 
Germany thereafter until 1914. 
In addition, after Fashoda110 had eliminated the 
Egyptian Question as an active foreign issue, there was no 
insuperable conflict of interest anywhere in the world 
between France and Great Britain.  Furthermore, the British, 
long accustomed to finding the French in their way, began to 
discover in the 189 0s that whenever they hoped to extend 
their possessions in Africa or the Pacific, the Germans were 
likely to appear and demand compensation.111 
The net result of these new European developments was a 
reluctant yet seemingly necessary reentrance of Britain into 
the world of entangling alliances she so despised.  By 1904 
Britain had reached an agreement with France.  And with 
France having come to terms with Russia ten years earlier, 
all that was left to complete a new three-way agreement was 
a pact between Great Britain and Russia.  This came about in 
1907 and the Triple Entente was born, immediately 
109Seton-Watson, p. 609. 
110The details of the storied Fashoda crisis are of little 
importance here, suffice to say that it involved a_showdown 
between a French force and a numerically superior British one 
which resulted in Britain becoming the dominant influence 
within Egypt. 
ulCraig, pp. 306-7. 
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confronting the Triple Alliance on the European chess- 
board. li: 
About the same time that Europe became polarized by the 
new alignments among the great powers, the nationalist 
undercurrents in the Balkans once again came to the front in 
the form of additional movements toward independence and 
self-determination.  These events naturally spawned 
accompanying stories of severe oppression against 
particular ethnic groups.  The importance of these events 
can not be understated, making it further useful to examine 
briefly the succession of Balkan crises that contributed to 
the consolidation of both opposing alliances, and the advent 
of World War One. 
British sentiments again turned toward the Balkans for 
moral and humanitarian reasons when the plight of the 
peasants in the Turkish administered suzerainty of Macedonia 
became common knowledge.  In the early 1900s, word spread of 
atrocities being committed against Macedonian peasants by 
Greek, Bulgarian, Serbian, Albanian and Turkish nationalist 
groups, all seeking political preeminence in the region. 
The British contemplated some form of intervention but 
dismissed the idea after an internal uprising in Turkey in 
19 07 had a resounding echo in the Balkans.  This revolt, 
"
2Ward and Gooch, Volume III, p. 366. The Triple Entente 
did not provide military guarantees in all instances. 
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organized by the "Young Turk" exiles in Western Europe 
succeeded in gaining a constitution in 1908 that would 
respect minority rights everywhere and "was hailed with 
delight throughout the Ottoman dominions, and the murdering 
bands disappeared as if by magic."  The Young Turks also 
hoped that these reforms would reinvigorate the Turkish 
people and enable them to hold on to the remnants of their 
empire in a fashion that would be acceptable to all."3 
H.  THE BALKANS AND WORLD WAR ONE 
The euphoria in Britain over what appeared to finally 
be liberal reform in Turkey was quickly overtaken by another 
event in 19 08 that would sow the seeds of a World War.  In 
that year, Austria annexed the provinces of Bosnia and 
Hercegovina much to the displeasure of Russia, Turkey, 
Serbia and Great Britain.  Ironically, in a bizarre sequence 
of diplomatic initiatives Russian foreign minister Ivolsky 
had helped to engineer the event, along with his Austrian 
counterpart Aehrenthal, only to have the Tsar reject it, 
mainly out of sensitivity to ultimate Serbian desires.  A 
brief war scare followed which saw Germany and Austria 
poised against Russia.   The crisis waned, however, as 
Russia, unprepared for war despite the potential support of 
113' Ward and Gooch, Volume III, pp. 400-1 
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the Triple Entente, backed down, and the annexation 
stood."4 
Russia, Britain and Serbia were particularly aggravated 
over the Bosnian crisis.  Russia had been embarrassed both 
by the handling of the affair in Vienna and Berlin, and by 
her inability, in her role as Panslavic protector, to 
adequately represent Serbian interests.  Great Britain was 
also dismayed by the belligerent attitudes displayed in 
Berlin and Vienna during the unfolding of events.  And 
Serbia was incensed over the acquisition by Austria of 
territory which Serbia regarded as being her own.  Serbia 
had designs on Bosnia as part of a greater Serbia and had 
hoped to someday reverse the Berlin Treaty Article which 
allowed Austria to administer the area.  This movement had 
become even more acute among Serbian nationalists after the 
pro-Hapsburg Serbian ruler Alexander was assassinated in 
1903 -115 
The annexation of Bosnia convinced Belgrade that 
Austria's ultimate aims were to absorb Serbia as well. 
Consequently, in March of 1912, Serbia and Bulgaria (with 
Russian support) concluded a pact promising to aid each 
other in case of attack, to cooperate in repelling attempts 
"
4Kissinger, pp. 195-6. also Craig, pp. 313-4. 
ll5Jelavich and Jelavich, pp. 72-3, also Middleton, pp. 
97-100. 
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by great powers to acquire Balkan territory, and to follow a 
common policy vis-a-vis Turkey.  Within a few months, both 
Greece and Montenegro had adhered to these articles, and the 
Balkan League had been formed.116 
Although originally conceived to thwart Austrian 
aggression, the League saw an immediate opportunity for 
conquest by expelling the Turks from Europe.  The Balkan 
powers declared war on the Turks in October of 1912 and 
quickly drove them back to the Straits.  The great powers, 
including Great Britain, stepped in at this point and 
mediated a settlement complete with revised borders.  The 
intervention prevented the war from expanding but, again, at 
the cost of much consternation among the Balkan nations-- 
most notably Serbia, which was denied access to the Adriatic 
Coast at the insistence of Austria.117 
Arguments then ensued among the victors as to the 
territorial spoils of their combined efforts.  A mere month 
passed when war broke out again as a disgruntled Bulgaria 
attacked Serbia.  This time Turkey and Rumania allied with 
the other members of the Balkan League and made short work 
116Craig, p. 316. 
117Middleton, p. 99. The peace conference in London 
subsequently laid the groundwork for the permanent creation of 
the state of Albania in 1913 on the Adriatic Coast. Serbia 
was compensated for this act with interior land of lesser 
strategic value. 
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of the Bulgarian forces.  As a result Bulgaria was forced to 
concede almost all gains from the first contest--a condition 
which left her extremely embittered.  In  contrast, the 
nations of Serbia, Rumania and Greece were encouraged by 
these successes and continued to look outward.  After the 
cessation of hostilities, the Serbian premier said boldly, 
"the first round is won; now we must prepare for the second, 
against Austria.""8 
In the brief period between the end of the Balkan Wars 
and the coming of World War One, Russia and Austria-Hungary 
maneuvered for influence and position in every Balkan 
country.119  The two European camps also became poised for 
what was viewed as an almost inevitable confrontation ahead. 
The diplomatic dam broke on June 14, 1914, in Sarajevo when 
a Serbian patriot named Gavrilo Princip assassinated the 
Austrian heir apparent, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, and his 
consort.  Satisfied that the Serbian Government was behind 
the plot, Austria-Hungary wasted little time in declaring 
war on July 28, after dispatching an ultimatum to Belgrade 
that was impossible for Serbia to accept.120 
"
8Craig, p. 317. 
"
9Seton-Watson, p. 641. 
120Middleton, pp. 100-101. 
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Any thoughts the British had of distancing themselves 
from the conflict eroded completely when Germany threw its 
full weight behind its ally, and struck out on two fronts. 
Austrian hegemony in the Balkans was one thing, Austro- 
German hegemony on the continent quite another: 
Britain would not have allowed herself 
to be involved in war because of a 
Balkan struggle between Russia and 
Austria.  But when France was drawn in, 
the issue affected British interests in 
a way too vital to ignore.  The 
clinching argument was Germany's 
invasion of Belgium.  Without that 
felony, as iniquitous as if not as 
inexcusable as Austria's attack on 
Serbia, British intervention might have 
been delayed.121 
The most important feature to take away from the 
British experience in the Balkans in World War One was that 
it was largely unsuccessful.  Diplomatic attempts were made 
to recruit several Balkan states (other than Serbia) or at 
least insure their neutrality throughout the war but this 
did not come to pass as a vengeful Bulgaria eventually sided 
with the Central Powers, conquered Serbia and provided the 
Central Powers with an effective link through the Balkans 
until the close of the war.122 
Even more distressing were the disastrous British (and 
Allied) military campaigns in the Balkan vicinity at 
121Middleton,   p.   103 
'-Craig,   pp.   339-340. 
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Gallipoli and Salonica.  The Allies had hoped to gain 
control of the Dardenelles (from recent Central Power ally 
Turkey) and weaken the opposition by opening an additional 
front at the "soft underbelly"123 of Europe in 1915.  The 
failure of these efforts instead had the dual effect of 
demoralizing the allied troops and damaging British prestige 
within the colonies of the Eastern Empire.124 
As for the Balkan states themselves, World War One had 
an emancipating effect of sorts in that it culminated with 
the dissolution of the three empires--Ottoman, Russian and 
Austro-Hungarian-- that had most often directly intervened in 
Balkan affairs.  Another outcome of the war was the 
appearance of a new state entity based on the Wilsonian 
concept of self-determination that was promoted at the 
Versailles peace conference while redrawing the map of 
Europe.  This was of course the creation of a large Balkan 
nation titled the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and 
Slovenes.125 
123The term "soft underbelly" is attributed to Winston 
Churchill although his use of it in Second World War plans has 
gained more historical notoriety. 
124Sir Michael Howard, The Continental Commitment, The 
Dilemma of British Defense Policy in the Era of the World 
Wars., (London: Temple Smith, 1972), pp. 53-73. 
125Jelavich and Jelavich, pp. 80-2. 
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This country, which became Yugoslavia in 1929, joined 
Rumania, Albania, Greece and a defeated and smaller 
Bulgaria, to form the new geo-political makeup of the Balkan 
Peninsula.  All five of these states suffered through 
tremendous internal political turmoil in the inter-war 
period.  Eventually each one would end up with a royal 
dictatorship of a varying degree.  Nonetheless, the only 
call to arms among them during this period was in Greece 
where an ill-advised foray into Asia Minor in 1921 led to a 
defeat of the Greek troops at the hands of a reforming 
Turkish Army, and the subsequent loss of spoils from the 
Versailles agreements.126 
I.  THE BALKANS AND WORLD WAR TWO 
Great Britain remained aloof from Balkan affairs during 
the inter-war period, satisfied that its continued 
occupation of Cyprus guaranteed its maritime security 
concerns in the region.  By the 1930s, political maneuvering 
had begun again in earnest on the continent to include a 
renewed interest by some, most notably France, Germany and 
Italy, in Balkan affairs.  Yet these latest developments did 
not move the British any closer to joining in the current 
round of Balkan machinations for they were now only too 
familiar with the complexities and hidden dangers that 
126Ibid, pp. 85-100. 
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surrounded Balkan politics: 
contention among powers closer at hand 
for predominance in Yugoslavia and the 
Balkans was observed by the British with 
interest--and usually with regret--but 
not until war loomed did the British see 
cause for involvement in so remote and 
intractable a region.... Balkan diplomats 
were insufferably tiresome, Balkan 
politicians invariably tortuous, Balkan 
intrigues impenetrably deep and Balkan 
disputes inevitably insoluble.127 
When war again came to Europe in 1939, the Balkans were 
once again largely a secondary concern to the major players. 
Hitler concentrated his efforts on swiftly dividing Poland 
with Stalin, and commencing his campaign against France. 
However, the early departure of France from the war, as well 
as the near loss of the British Expeditionary Force there, 
quickly changed the minds of the British with regard to the 
potential importance of diverting German efforts across the 
channel.   The specter of an additional front somewhere, 
perhaps in the Balkans, was once again raised.  Great 
Britain was in no position early on to commit a large number 
of troops to such an idea but did realize the importance of 
recruiting potential allies in such areas to preclude German 
127Mark C. Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia, 
1940-1943 , (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 6- 
7. 
dominance there.  And so the Balkans became strategically 
important once more. 
But by the time the British focused their efforts on 
the Balkans, they were already operating at a disadvantage 
there.  Albania had been successfully invaded by Italy in 
1939.  Rumania and Bulgaria had pledged their unofficial 
allegiance to the Axis early on in the fighting and would 
formerly join the same by 1942.  Of these, Rumania was the 
most valuable to the German war machine because of its 
extensive oil reserves.  Greece fell under attack by Italy 
in 1940 yet offered a stiff resistance and managed to bog 
down the Italian forces there.  And with Hungary to the 
north already in the German camp, this left Yugoslavia as 
the only Balkan nation left for the British to cultivate.128 
The genuine prospects for a British alliance with 
Yugoslavia seemed dim from the outset.  Virtually surrounded 
by Axis controlled states, Yugoslavia had to consider its 
survival first, and that survival seemed to hinge on not 
instigating a confrontation with Germany.  At the same time, 
however, Yugoslav ruler Prince Paul preferred the British to 
the Germans but was realistic in his assessment of both his 
own predicament, and the amount of concrete assistance 
Britain could actually provide in the way of men and 
l28Jelavich and Jelavich, pp. 95-103 
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machines.  And so a difficult, if not futile, balancing act 
ensued as the Prince maintained official Yugoslavian 
neutrality while simultaneously attempting to placate the 
desires of the British and the demands of the Germans.129 
In 1940, British intelligence agents began a campaign 
of subversion in Yugoslavia in an attempt to solicit the 
support of the masses and through them put pressure on the 
government to side with London.  At first, the British 
concentrated their efforts in this regard toward influencing 
the Serb nationalists, discounting the other peoples of 
Yugoslavia as well as the political left.130 The Serbs, 
British allies in the last war against Germany, were eager 
to hold a coup and establish a pro-British government in 
Belgrade.  London warned them against this twice in 1940, 
fearing that such an action would divert too much German 
power to the Balkans, forcing them to overrun the area on 
their way to rescue Mussolini in Greece.  London instead 
preferred Belgrade's neutrality so that the Yugoslavian 
forces could be better put to use once the tide of the war 
had turned.131 
129Wheeler, pp. 10-33. 
130Ibid, p. 25. 
131Ibid, pp. 10-33. 
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But the situation changed in early 1941.  It became 
obvious that Hitler would soon intervene to salvage the 
Italian forces in Greece.  At the same time increased 
pressure was being applied to Belgrade by Berlin.  Hitler 
was demanding that Yugoslavia take a position in the 
conflict.  The British now sensed the criticality of 
immediate Yugoslavian military intervention, and made last 
ditch attempts to prevent the Yugoslav submission to German 
might. 
All channels of communication were utilized, including 
correspondence between the Sovereigns of each nation, as 
well as between Churchill and Yugoslavian Premier Cvetkovic. 
In a dispatch on 22 March the Prime Minister implored his 
counterpart in Belgrade to bear in mind Britain's (and 
America's) certain ultimate victory.  He continued by 
threatening that, "if Yugoslavia were at this time to stoop 
to the fate of Rumania, or commit the crime of Bulgaria, and 
become an accomplice in the attempted assassination of 
Greece, her ruin will be certain and unrepairable." 
Churchill then appealed to their military value at this 
crucial moment, stating that, "the history of war has seldom 
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shown a finer opportunity than is open to Yugoslav armies if 
they seize it while time remains."132 
Despite these efforts the Prince remained inclined to 
sign the Axis Tripartite Pact (minus the military clauses) 
in order to prevent the destruction of his country at the 
hands of the Wehrmacht.  The Premier and Foreign Minister 
thus acted on behalf of the Prince in signing the amended 
Tripartite Pact March 25, 1941 in Vienna.  This regrettable 
event having transpired, the British resigned themselves to 
changing the government in Belgrade as the only means left 
of propelling the Yugoslavs into the war on the side of the 
allies.  A coup d'etat occurred on March 27, but was carried 
out unexpectedly by Yugoslav military leaders instead of the 
nationalist groups that British agents had been 
nurturing.133 
132- 2Ibid, p. 45. Churchill was referring to the possible 
employment of Yugoslavian troops against Italy which would 
have guaranteed the removal of the Italian military from the 
Balkans since their position in Greece would then be 
unsustainable. If this could be accomplished prior to German 
moves into the southern peninsula, it might force Hitler to 
reconsider the value of a Greek campaign. In contrast, the 
lack of Yugoslavian intervention at this point would insure 
the eventual fall of Greece outright if and when the Germans 
advanced, for the Greek and British forces would not be able 
to withstand a simultaneous Italian and German onslaught, 
unless they were provided the counterweight of the one million 
member Yugoslav Army. 
133Ibid, pp. 46-53. 
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The British hoped that this fact would be but a mere 
detail since the important event--a change in power to a 
pro-British administration (albeit a junta)--had taken 
place.  Excitement began to wane, however, as the new 
government, headed by a general named Simovic, waffled on 
where and, more importantly when, to commit federal troops 
to the front.  There was no such wavering in Berlin, 
however, where the coup represented uncertainty and 
potential delay in German plans, thus necessitating an 
.immediate resolution. 
The resultant war in Yugoslavia lasted a scant few weeks 
as German commanders once more verified their Blitzkrieg 
tactics on the field of battle and overwhelmed their 
disorganized victims.  Germany then allowed her partners in 
the neighboring areas to divide up the spoils of the 
Yugoslavian campaign.  British attempts at recruiting 
Yugoslavia had failed, Germany rolled through the country, 
and an identical fate for Greece would soon follow.  Yet 
this would prove to be only the beginning of British 
subversion efforts in the Balkans as the many peoples that 
had for centuries been subjugated by numerous tyrants began 
to take exception to their latest uninvited landlord--Adolf 
Hitler. 
134Ibid, pp.  54-61. 
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The emergence of resistance movements in the Balkans 
was a welcome addition to the British war effort, and the 
parties of these movements were rewarded accordingly with 
weapons and material.  In addition, Great Britain, in a 
fight for its very survival, now paid little regard to the 
future European order during its struggle against the Nazis; 
the British had no way of knowing that their sponsorship of 
leftist groups during the war would help usher in the 
polarized Europe of the Cold War.   The ideological 
affiliation of the rebels was, therefore, a secondary 
consideration.  The primary credential needed for a rebel to 
qualify for support in the eyes of the British being a 
desire to fight Germans: 
The most active and effective forces 
were generally those formed from the 
political left, and within these the 
communists were able to gain a 
controlling position....The Allies 
wartime policy of supporting those 
partisan groups who were doing the most 
fighting was based on the premise that 
the most important consideration was to 
win the war....The result of this 
decision was that at the end of the war 
the armed power in each region was in 
the hands of the communist-dominated 
resistance forces.135 
The resistance movements that grew in Yugoslavia and 
Greece were among the strongest in the Balkans, and the most 
significant to the allied cause.  Unfortunately, in 
l35Jelavich and Jelavich, p. 104 
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Yugoslavia, there existed more than one group and each one 
he^d its own charter of what was best for the nation.  The 
two main rebel forces were the Chetniks  and the Partisans. 
The Chetniks  were Serbian nationalists under the command of 
a Colonel Drazha Mihailovic.  They were the first to form 
and immediately began action against the occupying Germans 
and the puppet Ustasi  regime that had been established in 
the new, autonomous state of Croatia.136 
The Partisans  were born in Croatia under the leadership 
of Joseph Broz, better known as Tito.  The Partisans  were 
communists; and despite being ethnic Croats, they were 
strongly opposed to the anti-communist Ustasi   front and of 
course the Nazis.  For safety, the group was forced to 
relocate to Serb lands which brought them into conflict with 
the Chetniks.     As a result a wild and violent period in 
Yugoslavian history began as a four-way civil war commenced 
between the Chetniks,   the Partisans,   the Ustasi and a rump 
government in Serbia.  Before long the resident Muslims were 
involved as well, siding for the most part with the Croats 
136William T. Johnson, Deciphering the Balkan Enigma: 
Using History to Inform Policy, (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: U.S. 
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 25 March 1993), 
pp. 33-4. The Ustasi regime was a German-puppet Croatian 
nationalist government, loyal to the Axis, that was bent on 
making the new Yugoslavia a Croatian-dominated state. It was 
a brutal administration that murdered and expelled fellow 
Yugoslavs in its drive to achieve this ideal new Balkan 
nation. 
and the Nazis.  The brutalities that ensued from this 
convoluted internal struggle were to leave deep emotional 
scars among the various ethnic groups in the country that 
have come to life once more in the present conflict.137 
The British originally supported both the Chetniks  and 
the Partisans.     As the war progressed, however, it became 
apparent that the Chetniks  were more interested in killing 
Partisans  than Germans, and even suspended activities 
against the Nazis for a period of time.  This clearly went 
against British interests in the region and British 
diplomats protested profusely to Mihailovic, who was also by 
chance the Minister of war in the Yugoslav government-in- 
exile in London.138 
But Mihailovic was seemingly more concerned with the 
governmental composition of the post-war Yugoslavia, not 
realizing that in failing to best address issues at present, 
he would virtually guarantee his non-participation in that 
future makeup.  Because of this, and the fact that the 
Partisans  were emerging conclusively as the predominant 
force for the future administration of a free Yugoslavia, 
l37Ibid,   pp.   34-5. 
138Jelavich and Jelavich,   pp.   107-8. 
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the British threw their full weight behind Tito's forces in 
early 1944 . m 
By the time the Soviet forces assisted in the official 
liberation  of Belgrade, the feat had already been 
accomplished for the most part by Tito and his Partisans. 
This was naturally to Stalin's liking and the Soviets moved 
on to more pressing engagements.  Thus began the brutal 
reign of Tito in communist Yugoslavia.  And in his first 
move to consolidate his power he set out to eliminate those 
who had actively opposed the Partisan movement in the war. 
This purge resulted in the execution of over 100,000 
Yugoslavs of one sort or another, further exacerbating the 
ethnic hatreds that thrived during the occupation; the 
purges left Tito firmly entrenched in the Yugoslav seat of 
power.140 
J.  THE COLD WAR 
After the war the communist Yugoslavia spent little 
time in the Soviet "camp."  Incensed with Stalin's 
assertiveness regarding the internal affairs of his state, 
Tito made a formal break with the Soviet Bloc in a nine-hour 
139Wheeler, pp. 234-244, also Jelavich and Jelavich, pp. 
106-8. 
140Barbara Jelavich, History of the Balkans, Twentieth 
Century, Volume II, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1983), pp. 270-3. 
90 
speech to his government officials.141  Thereafter, despite 
continuing along communist lines, Tito's government began to 
fall obliquely under the influence of both East and West, 
much as Churchill and Stalin had agreed upon in 1944.142 
But the influence of the British in the Balkans, and 
the world for that matter, would never be the same after 
World War Two.  As the Cold War coalesced into being, the 
British had been forced to call upon the United States to 
lend assistance to defeat the communist elements in the 
Greek Revolution that began in 1946.  The proclamation of 
the Truman Doctrine in 1947143 was an indication that the 
allied leadership torch assumed by the Americans toward the 
end of the war was now firmly entrenched in Washington.144 
141 Barbara Jelavich, vol. II, pp. 321-31 
142Barbara Jelavich, vol. II, pp. 285-6. The author cites 
Churchill's memoirs in which he described the subject meeting 
with Stalin. During their talk on 9 October, 1944, both 
leaders, in an extremely off-hand manner similar to the way 
they discussed the realignment of Poland's borders, addressed 
the Balkan question with regard to post-war spheres of 
influence. Churchill passed Stalin a note suggesting Soviet 
predominance in Bulgaria and Rumania, British stewardship in 
Greece, and equal influence in both Hungary and Yugoslavia. 
Stalin agreed to the proposal with a single, symbolic stroke 
of his pen. 
143The key passage was " [it is] the policy of the United 
States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted 
subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures." 
144Kissinger, pp. 451-453. 
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Soon after, the vaunted British Empire began to unravel 
as independence movements were recognized in one area after 
another.  Nuclear weapons would usher in the era of the 
superpowers and relegate Britain to the unfamiliar role of a 
secondary power.145  Britain acquired nuclear weapons 
itself, but its continued reliance during the Cold War on 
American military might and deterrence capabilities is 
indisputable. 
Other than the Greek revolution of 1946, British 
involvement in the Balkans during the Cold War was largely 
confined to resolving the dispute over Cyprus between fellow 
NATO members Greece and Turkey.  Great Britain granted 
independence to that island nation in 19 60, after nearly a 
century of British administration, only to watch the 
island's politics fall into chaos.  A Cypriot civil war 
commenced between the ethnic Greek and the ethnic Turkish 
inhabitants, subsequently drawing both Greece and Turkey 
into the conflict.  After a ceasefire was declared, a United 
Nations peacekeeping mission was dispatched to the island, 
and it remained there to this day.  This contingent of U.N. 
troops has always had British soldiers among its ranks. 
145There are a great many volumes devoted to Great 
Britain's retrenchment from Empire. Among these, The Long 
Retreat by C.J. Bartlett is outstanding. 
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The Balkans of the Cold War era consisted of Greece, 
Albania, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, and Romania.  Of these only 
Greece maintained a democratic form of government (except 
for the period under military rule , 1967-1974).  The 
remaining nations were communist of one form or another and 
with varying degrees of allegiance to Moscow.  The West 
attempted to cultivate relationships with the Balkan 
communist nations but, for the most part, the efforts made 
in the form of monetary assistance and political activities 
made little headway toward transforming any of the 
governments.  The most that can be said is that Western 
exertions were able to loosen Soviet control over these 
areas and help bring about a "neutrality," or 
"nonalignment," of Yugoslavia in particular with respect to 
its Cold War allegiance.146 
But with the Greek Civil War having taken place during 
the early phase of the Cold War, there was never another 
battle to determine which camp retained the most influence 
in the Balkans.  One can never know whether the Soviets were 
willing to use Budapest, Berlin, and Prague tactics in a 
Balkan capital any more than one can ascertain whether the 
response from the West in such a scenario would have been 
similar to its stance in previous Eastern Bloc upheavals. 
l46Barbara  Jelavich,   vol.   II,   pp.   328-9,   37? 
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K.  SUMMARY 
This brief sketch of British history in the Balkans is 
by no means comprehensive but does bring to the fore the 
major incursions by Great Britain into Balkan political and 
military affairs.  It has been seen that British 
interventions in the Balkans have occurred across a wide 
spectrum of European settings during which time British 
interests have changed, as has Britain's status from that as 
a preeminent world power to its current standing. 
The Balkans came to the forefront of British foreign 
policy during the era of the Pax Britannica and the 
appearance of the Eastern Question.  British statesmen of 
the nineteenth century attempted to balance their national 
interests in the region with the desires of a public 
concerned about moral obligations.  This led Britain to 
follow a policy for most of the century that included 
propping up a weakening Ottoman Empire to preclude the 
dangerous extension of Russian influence in the Near East 
and the Balkans.  The danger that Britain feared was a loss 
of maritime superiority in the Eastern Mediterranean and the 
possible disruption of the prized British trade routes to 
India and the Far East. 
This policy came to its reckoning in the 1870s when it 
became apparent that Britain could no longer, with good 
conscience, support the Turks, who had repeatedly committed 
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offenses not in keeping with the moral aspirations of the 
British nation.  After the Congress of Berlin, the British 
retreated briefly from Balkan and European political 
maneuvering, only to be drawn back into both out of both 
public demand at home and the realization that British 
security would be in jeopardy if they chose to remain 
isolated. 
The World Wars saw Great Britain fighting in Europe 
over traditional British concerns regarding the unacceptable 
rise of a continental hegemonic power.  The Balkans played a 
part in the British history of both wars but with different 
degrees of success.  The British military expeditions in the 
region in World War One were strategically unsuccessful and 
devastating in terms of casualties.  In World War Two, 
another unsuccessful attempt to divert German might to a 
front in the Balkans occurred, but, the resistance movements 
championed by the British there during the Nazi occupation 
were so successful as to have the desired effect.  An 
inordinate amount of Wehrmacht divisions had to be allocated 
to the rebellious Balkan region, which contributed 
significantly to the ultimate allied victory. 
The Cold War yielded comparatively little British 
action in the Balkans.  The British call for American 
assistance during the Greek Civil War was a clear indication 
that the last war had put a severe drain on the economic and 
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psychological resources of the nation.  Thereafter, the Cold 
War stalemate in Europe provided little opportunity for 
Western inroads into the Balkans, with the exception of the 
unique neutrality of Yugoslavia.  In any event, with its 
vast Empire relinquished and its status among world powers 
beginning to decline, Great Britain was no longer physically 
able to affect the Balkan equation as it had for the 
previous one hundred and fifty years. 
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IV.  ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS: THE ESSENTIAL BRITISH 
PURPOSES IN THE BALKANS TODAY 
A.  Setting the World Stage 
A brief examination of the current international 
situation may be useful in assessing the value of some of 
nhe traditional British security paradigms with respect to 
the current Balkan War.  Of primary importance is the fact 
that the Cold War has ended.  The rapid demise of the Soviet 
Union has left the United States alone in the category of 
"superpowers." This new strategic situation has led some to 
suggest that we have entered a period of unipolarity in the 
world order.147 Others see the  world instead reverting back 
to a multipolar environment.  In such a system the United 
States would qualify as one of several "major" powers, along 
with the likes of Russia, China, Britain, France, Germany 
and Japan. 
Whatever the configuration, the world will no longer be 
subjected to the same ideological battle of conquest and 
containment that dominated international politics from 1945- 
1989.  In the new situation, the major threat to the 
security of many nations has been removed. 
It seems logical that in such an environment, nations 
that were previously restricted in their foreign ambitions 
147Kissinger,   p.   809. 
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because of the constraints imposed by the superpowers will 
now have an opportunity to pursue their national agendas 
with fewer inhibitions.  Moreover, some approaches to 
international relations theory suggest that at a time such 
as this, when (for certain privileged nations at least) 
there is an abundance of real security, nations are more 
likely to pursue their own aims, with less concern for 
allies and other partners since security is not such an 
overriding concern.148  In NATO, "renationalization" trends 
have become evident. 
Because of this evolving political backdrop, nations 
that have the political-military capability to influence 
affairs abroad, can be reasonably sure that, if the 
situation goes awry, it will not lead to a superpower 
nuclear confrontation.  This was, of course, the ultimate 
fear' during the Cold War.  Consequently, it will not be 
surprising to see more nation-states pursuing foreign policy 
goals that are more national in their origins, and more 
reflective of the ideals of the people as a whole. 
With the aforementioned global setting in mind, prior 
to embarking upon an examination of the relevance of the 
concepts of strategic culture and national interest with 
respect to the British handling of the current Balkan War, 
l48Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, 
[New York: Random House, 1979), pp. 91-2. 
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we must first broach the issue of national participation. 
More specifically, at the outset of the discussion on the 
reasons for the British operations and diplomatic overtures 
visible today, it is imperative to recall the importance of 
ehe national identity of the soldiers assigned to a U.N. 
peacekeeping mission. 
The nationality of peacekeepers is one of the main 
factors that the U.N. must examine prior to organizing a 
peacekeeping force for a particular region.  It is a given 
that troops of a certain hypothetical nationality placed in 
the wrong peacekeeping setting, despite donning blue 
helmets, could destabilize a situation.  Such a detrimental 
and provocative result would be possible if the presence of 
certain foreign troops in a region revived historical 
animosities left over from earlier events.149 
Moreover, national governments also acknowledge this 
situation and are not likely to expose their troops in a 
mission of peace that may instead put them in harm's way. 
Germany, for one, is currently in the process of confronting 
this issue, since the reinterpretation of its Basic Law in 
July 1994 will allow German troops to participate in U.N. 
peacekeeping initiatives in the future. 
'■"Malcolm Rifkind, "Peace and Stability--The British 
Military Contribution", pp. 5, 7-8. Text of a speech given to 
the Carnegie Council in New York on 13 April 1994. 
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Applying this very principle to future German 
operations, for example, might eliminate numerous regions as 
being politically unsuitable for the deployment of the 
Bundeswehr if it is determined that it would not be prudent 
for it to visit foreign soil that had been previously tread 
on by the Wehrmacht: 
...Germany is now a nation capable of 
sharing the security burden.  German 
politicians had hidden behind the 
Constitution whenever the question of 
committing troops abroad came up.  But 
the real impediments remain historical 
and political. 15° 
Moreover, any German suspicions that the Balkans might 
indeed be one such "off limits" area to their German troops 
were partially confirmed by an Albanian initiative earlier 
this year.  Bundeswehr Inspector General Klaus Naumann told 
his audience in a speech at the "Bundeswehr and Society" 
forum on 22 March, that German ships and aircraft were not 
be allowed to enter Albanian waters or airspace, even though 
Albania has permitted NATO to use its territorial areas to 
enforce the embargo in the Adriatic.131 
This example illustrates the point that the nationality 
and perceived impartiality of peacekeepers is a sensitive 
150
"The German Special Relationship", New York Times,   July 
11, 1994, p. A10. 
1MKlaus Naumann, "The Bundeswehr is Undergoing a Change 
Equal to a New Beginning", speech given on 22 April 1994, 
condensed in Welt Am Sonntag,   27 April 1994, pp. 25,27. 
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issue to the countries hosting the missions.  Seen in this 
light, the case can safely be made that the British 
themselves have made a national   commitment to the operations 
in Bosnia, even though it has been under the guise of that 
supreme international  body--United Nations. 
B.  STRATEGIC CULTURE VERSUS THE NATIONAL INTEREST 
1.  A Case for "Historical Responsibility" 
It has already been established that the current 
British military presence in the Balkans is not 
unprecedented in terms of attempting to influence Balkan 
politics.  Barbara Jelavich suggests that peninsula has not 
merely fallen under the occasional influence of the historic 
powers, but rather has suffered in large part due to their 
diplomatic power plays and military intervention.  The 
Balkans are in turmoil today in part due to the manipulation 
and machinations by the powers of yesterday: 
The Eastern Question did indeed turn the 
Balkans into the "powderkeg of Europe," 
but the  responsibility for this 
situation lay as much with the great 
powers and the principle of the balance 
of power as with the Balkan states.152 
As one of the great powers mentioned above, Britain 
played a key part in the troubled history of the Balkans. 
And while the historical British presence may at first seem 
'^Barbara Jelavich, Vol. II, p. 440 
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to be largely inconsequential to today's conflict, a closer 
analysis reveals that the British may feel some 
responsibility for current events in the Balkans. 
From a strategic culture standpoint, the extensive 
British presence in the Balkans since the early nineteenth 
century provides those "historical links" to that region, as 
discussed previously, that the British established in many 
corners of the world. From this alone, and given the 
fundamental fact that the Balkans are in Europe, one could 
presume that events there today should still be of concern 
to Britain. 
But perhaps as important are the effects  that British 
initiatives in the Balkans have had in the past.     As has 
already been documented here, Great Britain's historical 
forays into the Balkans have really been due to three 
concerns: the "Eastern.Question", but most notably the 
prevention of Russian dominance in the Balkans; in this 
century, as part of a grand strategy to defeat a continental 
threat to security (Germany); or in response to the British 
public's concern for the moral issues there such as 
nationalist movements of self-determination and campaigns 
for peace and human rights. 
The first two of these calls to action harken back to 
basic "national interest" and security concerns while the 
latter reflects the moral and idealistic undercurrents in 
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British foreign policy.  Despite this distinction with 
respect to the causes of British intervention, Britain's 
conduct in carrying out its designs there did not always 
reflect an acute concern for the impact that its part in 
Balkan power-brokering would have on long-term Balkan 
stability. 
Even when issues such as respect for minorities and the 
establishment of equitable boundaries were at stake during 
the many international conferences on the Balkans, the 
British, as was the case with the other powers, were never 
able to fully resolve some of the conflicts between their 
own national interests and what was best for the Balkan 
nations. 
Moreover, British leverage and power during the 
historical negotiations on the Balkans were significant. 
Even though it was the Russians, the Austrians, the Turks, 
and later the Germans, that most often stormed the area with 
troops, the British influence in the subsequent peace 
processes was undeniable.  This was evident at the first of 
the great conferences that included Balkan issues on its 
agenda--the Congress of Berlin: 
When asked to reflect on the center of 
gravity at the Congress, Bismarck 
pointed to Disraeli: "Der alte Jude,   das 
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ist der Mann"   (The old Jew, he is the 
man) .I53 
And as "the man," Disraeli no doubt had a part in 
laying the groundwork for the Bosnian debacle, as discussed 
earlier, from which the road to World War One really began 
in earnest when, "Austria frivolously implemented a thirty- 
year-old codicil from the Congress of Berlin in which the 
powers had agreed to let Austria annex Bosnia- 
Hercegovina."'54 Moreover, despite the fact that the 
Congress of Berlin was the most significant event in the 
nineteenth century in terms of recognizing national 
liberation movements, by the time it was completed, none of 
the Balkan states was satisfied with its contents, or sated 
in its territorial objectives.155 
It may be difficult for some to accept that ethnic 
groups in the Balkans could harbor animosities over events 
and conferences that happened so long ago, but this is the 
case: 
The trek of over 1,000,000 Serbs to the 
"Field of the Blackbirds" in Kosovo in 
1989 to commemorate the 600th 
anniversary of the Ottoman victory that 
ended an independent Serbia best 
153Kissinger,   p.   155 
l54Ibid,   p.   195. 
'"Barbara  Jelavich,   Vol.   II,   pp.   7-8. 
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illustrates, perhaps, the depth of 
historical attachment in this region. 
Still, if one should seek more recent examples of the 
negative impact of British intervention in Balkan affairs, 
one need look no further than to the creation of Yugoslavia 
after the First World War, or to the complicated resistance 
movements in the Balkans in World War Two.  In both cases, 
the British were unquestionably the chief sponsors. 
In the first instance, the British, and others, 
succumbed to Wilsonian concepts of national self- 
determination while redrawing the map of Europe.  The Great 
Powers' attempts to create a Kingdom of Croats, Serbs and 
Slovenes that would be acceptable to all in the region 
failed to consider whether the new state would be able to 
overcome the predominant historical force in the Balkans-- 
ethnicity.  It the end it could not and Yugoslavia was in a 
state of political disarray years before the coming of 
Hitler's Reich.157     In World War Two, little attention 
was paid by Britain to which resistance movements would be 
best for the future stability of the Balkan states.  There 
were much more pressing problems at the time, such as 
156J.F.O. McAllister, "Ever Greater Serbia," Time, 
September 28, 1992, p. 56. 
'"George F. Will, "Bedeviled by Ethnicity," Newsweek, 
August 24, 1992, pp. 47-8. See also Jelavich and Jelavich, pp. 
96-9, and Kissinger, p. 808. 
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preventing the Wehrmacht from rolling through all of Europe. 
Consequently, as long as Germans were being killed by 
resistance rebels, the latter would garner British support. 
As a result, Great Britain abandoned its first resistance 
allies, the Serb-dominated Chetniks, and threw its weight 
behind the Partisan movement, led by the future Yugoslavian 
Communist ruler, Tito. 
The Serb population suffered severely during the war at 
the hands of both the Partisans and the Nazi-sponsored 
Ustasi regime in Croatia.  And after the war, Tito 
proceeded, in a particularly brutal fashion, to solidify his 
dictatorial position by executing nearly all those who had 
actively opposed his Partisan movement during World War Two 
and the concurrent Yugoslav Civil War (despite the fact that 
it had been one of the most confusing periods in history, 
even by Balkan standards) .158 
These events may help to explain why the British are 
overtly less willing to punish the Serbs for their actions 
in Bosnia than is the United States, which continues to call 
for harsher measures against Serbia.  Perhaps the British, 
having been the main promoter of Tito during World War Two, 
"'Johnsen, pp. 33-6. Johnsen notes that the term "ethnic 
cleansing," made notorious by the current Serb atrocities, was 
used by the Ustasi regime while conducting the forced 
emigration and murder campaign that uprooted or exterminated 
hundreds of thousands of Serbs and Muslims. 
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feel a sense of responsibility, or even guilt, for the way 
events unfolded in the Balkans in World War Two, and are 
thus adamant against taking sides in this latest of Balkan 
calamities.  Churchill did, after all, realize only too late 
what a monster he had created in Yugoslavia.159 
Perhaps the sense of responsibility goes back further, 
to the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, when 
Britain took an active role in determining the fate of the 
Balkans by participating at historic gatherings on the 
"Eastern Question."  These conferences were very similar in 
that virtually all ignored the representation of the Balkan 
nations while simultaneously constructing new Balkan borders 
that were rarely popular and never enduring. 
British Secretary of State for Defense Malcolm Rifkind 
alluded to these feelings of responsibility and 
accountability within the British psyche in a speech given 
to the Carnegie Council on 13 April 1994, entitled, "Peace 
and Stability--The British Military Contribution."  The 
underlying theme of the speech appeared to be an appeal for 
an increased U.S. involvement in the Bosnian crisis through 
greater U.S. support of British objectives in the U.N. and, 
ideally, an infusion of additional American military 
manpower in the Balkans.  Mr. Rifkind painted the Bosnian 
l;,9Michael Lees, The Rape of Serbia, (New York: Harcourt, 
Brace, Jovanovich, 1990), pp. 333-41. 
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affair as being both a concern of Great Britain's in the 
strategic cultural sense, as well as a national interest. 
His comments reveal much about the way in which the British 
view this crisis: 
For the United Kingdom , like the United 
States, the investment in peace is not a 
simple one, and nor is it confined to 
our region of the world.  There are many 
reasons for the wide spread of the 
United Kingdom's engagements round the 
world.  In addition to overseas 
territories, extensive economic and 
trading interests, and historical and 
emotional ties in many areas of the 
world, we have a developed sense of 
responsibility in matters international. 
This international outlook is one we 
share in particular with the United 
States and our European partners.  It 
has led us to acknowledge that national 
and regional endeavors which are too 
narrowly focused and which, therefore, 
do not promote and protect peace world- 
wide, do not, in the end, promote our 
national interests.160 
When Mr. Rifkind spoke of "historical and emotional 
ties in many areas of the world," and a "developed sense of 
responsibility in matters international," he was referring 
to a specific strategic cultural trait that emanated from 
the British imperial and colonial experience.  British 
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Douglas Hurd issued a 
similar statement in a presentation to the Royal United 
Services Institute in October of 1992.  Mr Hurd submitted 
l60Malcom Rifkind, Carnegie Speech, p. 2. 
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that the British would continue in peacekeeping endeavors in 
part due to a "developed sense of international 
responsibility. "161 
Mr. Rifkind also makes a deliberate and obvious attempt 
i in ehe previous passage) to drum up support among his 
American audience by submitting that the United States has 
similar long-term goals.  Yet in doing so he forgets that 
while the United States has similar ties in the world, they 
may not be to the same regions as the British, and for 
obvious reasons.  The United States has its own strategic 
culture, and with the recent collapse of its chief foe in 
foreign confrontations, it seems less concerned with 
overseas ventures and inclined to concentrate more on 
matters closer to home.  The American decision to intervene 
in Haiti after withdrawing from Somalia may be an indication 
of this trend.  As a result, the United States may not feel 
obligated in the post-Cold War world to assist the British 
militarily in every crisis. 
In addition, Mr. Rifkind touched upon the economic and 
trading interests that influence British foreign policy, and 
how the maintenance of peace is important to ensure the 
vitality of these operations.  There is no doubt that, on 
the whole, commerce benefits from conditions of world 
l6iDouglas  Hurd,  "Foreign  Policy  and  International 
Security", The RUSI Journal,   December 19 92, p. 3. 
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cooperation.  But this should not be misconstrued so as to 
suggest that peace in the Balkans today, for example, is as 
important to British commercial concerns as it was in the 
previous century.  Great Britain has many more trading 
partners today, in a world that is getting smaller all the 
time.  Trade with the Balkan states is but one modest 
ingredient in the British economy.  Furthermore, instability 
in the region today does not threaten to lead to a 
disruption in the prized British routes to India as it did 
in the nineteenth century. 
But perhaps the most strategic culturally-biased aspect 
of Mr. Rifkind's comments is the conviction that the 
idealistic call to promote peace world-wide is tied directly 
with the national interests of the U.S. and Great Britain. 
As an ultimate goal, world-wide peace is traditionally 
viewed as being a moral and idealistic ambition and not a 
specific national   interest,   by the definition in this thesis 
(that is, focusing on power and the material interests of 
the nation-state).  It is a tall order to aspire to achieve 
so lofty an aim. 
From an American perspective, one need only consider 
the Congressional initiatives concerning the use of U.S. 
troops in United Nations peacekeeping contingents.  In the 
much publicized "Contract with America" sponsored by the 
Republican Party, there is a provision calling for a law 
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that will "require the President to certify to Congress that 
each peacekeeping operation is of vital national 
interest. "16: 
2.  A Case for "Immediate Responsibility" 
With the justifications for the claim of historical 
responsibility firmly in mind it is imperative to examine 
the immediate causes of today's conflict as well.  An 
understanding of the circumstances that prompted military 
action in the Balkans may yield additional information as to 
who may feel a sense of "immediate responsibility" for the 
outbreak of this conflict. 
As is the case for every significant historical event, 
there will eventually be several different versions in print 
with regard to the unfolding of events.  Scholars will 
devote enormous research toward writing an official history 
of the affair but in the end even this effort will be 
rejected by some (the origins of World War One offer an 
example).  Yet for the purposes of this study, it is 
essential to attempt to focus on an event, or series of 
incidents, that may have initiated the fighting.  British 
responsibility, however slight, may have justified further 
British intervention. 
l62Tom Masland and James Whitmore, "Going Down the Aid 
"Rathole'?", Newsweek,   December 5, 1994, p. 39. 
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The landmark event most often cited in the media and 
journals as being the primary cause of hostilities did not 
even transpire in the Balkans proper.  It was instead a 
diplomatic overture by the European Union--the recognition 
of Croatia and Slovenia in December of 1991--that, while not 
the initial source of ignition, provided the fuel for the 
conflict to burn indefinitely. 
The first shots in the Third Balkan War were actually 
fired in Slovenia in mid-1991 after that nation, as well as 
Croatia, declared its independence from the Serb-dominated 
federal government in Belgrade.  The thought of an 
independent Croatia conjured up images in the minds of the 
Serbian minorities there of the brutal Ustasi regime in 
World War Two.  It is doubtful that this brutality would 
have been repeated in contemporary Croatia but the fear 
nonetheless gave the Serbs a rationale to take up arms. 
Meanwhile, in Belgrade, the well-armed and predominantly 
Serbian-led Yugoslav Army used the occasion to begin its 
quest for a "greater Serbia."163  There were some breaks in 
the fighting through the rest of 1991.  But as the year came 
to a close the EC made its fateful decision. 
'"Michael G. Roskin, "The Third Balkan War, and How It 
Will End", Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, 
Autumn 1994, pp. 57-69. 
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In the meantime, in the capitals of Europe, while peace 
initiatives were being explored, the Balkan War was 
condemned to expansion when the European Union (still 
officially the European Community at that point) recognized 
the independence of both Slovenia and Croatia in December of 
1991, playing into the hands of the Serbian propaganda 
campaign and "justifying" the Serbian cause.  Worst of all 
was the reporting that it had been Germany, the founder of 
the infamous Ustasi Croatia, that bullied its other EC 
partners into the diplomatic gesture.164 
Furthermore, at a time when concern for a united EC was 
considered paramount, London and Paris were both worried 
about the internal damage to political cohesion within the 
community that would result from a unilateral German 
recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, or from the failure to 
reach any policy agreement whatsoever: 
164In a 28 November 1994 lecture at Stanford University 
given by the Director of Modern History Studies at Cambridge 
University, the speaker--Professor Michael Stenton--revealed 
that the economically powerful Germans had used leverage with 
regard to concessions within the Maastricht accord in order to 
gain acceptance of its recognition policy for Slovenia and 
Croatia. This is also verified in John Zametica's the "The 
Yugoslav Conflict", Adelphi Paper no. 2 70, (London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1992), p. 65. 
The author states, "The UK, entertaining serious misgivings to 
the end, finally gave in to the pressure from Bonn as a return 
favour for Germany's compromises at Maastricht over EC 
monetary union." In the footnote for this passage, the author 
cites private interviews with FCO officials. 
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The crisis in Yugoslavia caught the EC 
at an unfortunate moment: It was in the 
middle of a heated debate about its 
political destination.  Prominent in the 
debate were the questions of a common 
defence identity and, hardly less 
controversially, a common foreign 
policy.... thus it was critically 
important to them to preserve what could 
be preserved of EC unity in foreign 
affairs.  Had they allowed Germany to 
take unilateral action, as it had 
repeatedly threatened in no uncertain 
terms, that unity would have been very 
difficult to rebuild.165 
As a result, despite the fact that it was now feared 
that a recognition of the breakaway states would surely 
cause the region to explode, the leaders of the EC 
demonstrated that for their long-term purposes "consensus 
was more important than peace."166 
This need for unanimity in the EC was joined by a sense 
of "immediate responsibility" as the conflict intensified. 
This was evident in the way in which the EC approached this 
violent crisis occurring in its post-Cold War sphere of 
influence.  Unfortunately, it was not long before the Third 
Balkan War proved to be anything but the diplomatic 
building-block sought by Brussels: 
165 Zametica, pp. 59, 65 
l66This observation is also drawn from the Stenton 
lecture. Although he made a specific reference to those in 
positions of influence in Great Britain when making the 
"consensus" point, the other governments fell in line as well. 
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The Europeans favored EC leadership 
because Yugoslavia was viewed as an 
opportune foreign policy challenge at 
the very moment German Chancellor Helmut 
Kohl, French President Francois 
Mitterand and others wished to display 
the EC's ability to act effectively and 
cohesively.  Luxembourg's foreign 
minister, speaking for the EC's troika 
of emissaries, proclaimed it "the hour 
of Europe," a quote whose painful echo 
is a reminder of how badly the Europeans 
misjudged the dogs of this Balkan 
war.167 
There appears to be one more reason for British 
intervention in the Balkan crisis that is influenced by the 
British strategic culture--the cry for humanitarian 
assistance.  Much like Mr. Rifkind's earlier idealistic call 
for world peace, humanitarian assistance is an awesome task 
that does not fit within the confines of the definition of 
national interest used here (that is, focusing on power and 
the material interests of the nation-state).  Nonetheless, 
the British aspire to high moral standards in the conduct of 
their foreign affairs, and have made the humanitarian issue 
in the Balkans a cause for action before, as far back as the 
Greek Revolution of 1830.  This fact, coupled with the 
findings about historical and immediate responsibilities 
previously reported, necessitated that the British take an 
167David Gompert, "How to Defeat Serbia", Foreign Affairs, 
July/August 1994, p. 35. 
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active role in limiting the suffering in this latest show of 
Balkan horrors. 
The humanitarian mission was, after all, the first 
mission that generated public interest in the West.  Mr. 
John Home Robertson, a member of Parliament, appealed for 
the continuation of this humanitarian cause in the Balkans, 
in a recent House of Commons debate.  In his comments he 
also extolled the virtues of international institutions such 
as the U.N.: 
... it would be unthinkable for the 
United Nations to walk away from the 
humanitarian task that it set up in the 
former Yugoslavia.  Millions of people 
are now dependent on supplies delivered 
under United Nations protection.  I saw 
some of those people in recent weeks, 
and it would be a crime to abandon them. 
Quite apart from our humanitarian 
obligations, we cannot afford to destroy 
the credibility of the United Nations as 
an international peacekeeping 
organisation.  It might not be very 
good, but it is still all we have and it 
must be sustained.'68 
168John Home Robertson, House of Commons Official Report-- 
Parliamentary Debates (Hansard) 18 October 1994, p. 176. Mr. 
Rifkind closed his speech (the same speech cited earlier in 
this study) with this statement: "the U.N. is the best 
organisation we have in this imperfect world to strive for 
peace and stability. We need to cherish and improve the U.N. 
We cannot let it go the way of the League of Nations." 
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C.  A BOSNIAN TRAGEDY 
At the time of this writing, the international efforts 
to bring peace to the beleaguered state of Bosnia have been 
disappointing.  A seemingly endless series of negotiations 
has yielded little in the way of actual progress toward a 
resolution of the conflict; attempts to reach agreements on 
the issues have left most of the parties dissatisfied. 
When British peacemaking efforts bogged down and 
fighting continued, the British asked the United States for 
assistance in the form of ground troops, but that type of 
American aid was not forthcoming.  In this regard, American 
policy toward the Balkans has been influenced much more by 
the national interest (in the narrow, material sense used in 
this thesis) than has Great Britain's.  David Gompert of the 
Rand Corporation seems to accurately reflect this U.S. 
attitude: 
Great as our sorrow is for the slaughter 
and for our mistakes, it is unfair to 
suggest that the United States bears the 
main responsibility.  Our military 
superiority and international leadership 
role do not obligate us to sacrifice our 
sons and daughters to combat brutality 
wherever it occurs .i69 
Thus, the U.S.-British "special relationship" that 
appeared to have been strengthened during the Gulf War has 
been distinctly absent in the present conflict.  This 
169Gompert,   p.   30. 
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absence has also been evident in the November 1994 U.S. 
decision to unilaterally lift the arms embargo against the 
Bosnian Muslims and Croats, against strong opposition from 
both London and Paris. 
Yet even worse from the British perspective has been 
the appearance and application of the dreaded word 
"appeasement" to Britain's hamstrung operations in Bosnia. 
The scapegoat for the appeasement accusations has been the 
British General Michael Rose, who leads the United Nations 
Protection Forces (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia.  In October of this 
year, Anthony Lewis wrote that Rose's soft approach toward 
the Serbs "faithfully reflects the weakest, most pathetic 
British Government of modern times."170 On December 4, 
1994, Stanley Hoffmann openly compared Bosnia to Munich and 
Ethiopia.171  And at home in the House of Commons, the 
General fell under the unusual criticism of a House member: 
I appreciate that it is difficult to 
deal with people such as the Bosnian 
Serb authorities, but I doubt whether 
appeasement is the right line, so I was 
very surprised when General Rose rebuked 
Bosnian Government forces for seeking to 
secure part of their own territory 
during the past month.  It is a mistake 
to try to be even-handed between an 
aggressor and his victims, especially 
"°Anthony Lewis, "Wrong From The Start", New York Times, 
October 10, 1994, p. A12. 
171Stanley  Hoffmann,   "What  Will  Satisfy  Serbia's 
Nationalists?", New York Times,   OP-ED page, December 4, 1994. 
118 
when one is acting on behalf of the 
United Nations.172 
As of December 1994, the Balkan War is back in full 
swing.  The expected infusion of arms into the area since' 
the lifting of the embargo enforcement by the U.S. may take 
some time, but the American decision may have provided the 
West Europeans with a justification for withdrawing their 
forces from the Balkans.  By stressing the increased danger 
to their peacekeeping forces as a result of the lifting of 
the embargo by the U.S., the Europeans have been given a 
rationale to withdraw. 
Should the British decide to remove their troops from 
Bosnia altogether, it will doubtless usher in a new phase of 
the war which will, in all probability, no longer end 
through negotiation but rather through the defeat of one 
side by the other.  The British will then probably devote 
their efforts toward preventing the conflict from spreading 
to neighboring trouble spots such as Kosovo, or Macedonia. 
It is widely feared that the ethnic composition and 
historical animosities in these regions could potentially 
fuel a much larger Balkan War if the current conflict were 
to spread to any one such area.  Such a war could ravage 
more Balkan areas and possibly draw in neighboring nations 
such as Albania, Bulgaria, Turkey  and Greece.  At worst, 
172Robertson, p. 177. 
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such a war could involve those nations just mentioned plus 
several others, possibly including the United States and 
Russia.  Great Britain would obviously be unable to remain 
aloof from this type of crisis. 
The British will probably attempt to thwart this 
disaster by bolstering the American troop presence in 
Macedonia and perhaps other regions.  In the speech by Mr. 
Rifkind referred to earlier, the Secretary, in outlining the 
objectives in Bosnia, first mentioned "containing the 
conflict" as being one of the three aims of the 
international community.  Yet later in his remarks he 
repeated the overall strategy for the Bosnian operations but 
this time left out the "containment" clause.173 
Perhaps this was an unconscious omission on his part, 
but maybe not.  Adherence to the policy of mere containment 
of the conflict certainly does not reflect the British 
experience in Bosnia thus far.  But as the U.S. prepares to 
assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from Bosnia, British 
goals may change overnight.174  If this happens, the new 
British objective, preventing the third cataclysmic war in 
173Rifkind Speech, pp. 3, 5. 
l74Douglas Jehl, "25,000 U.S. Troops To Aid U.N. Force If 
It Quits Bosnia", New York   Times,   December 9, 1994, pp. Al, 
A7. 
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Europe this century, will reflect the only true British 
national interest in the current Bosnian tragedy. 
In summary, strategic culture can wield considerable 
impact in the formation of British foreign policy.  The 
narrowly defined concept of national interest that is 
employed in this work has also been a factor in British 
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